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Abstract 
 
Repatriation and State Reconstruction:  
Tracing the Agency of Afghan Returnees in the Face of Human Insecurity 
 
Stella Maria Wojdyla, M.A.;MGPS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Heather Hindman 
 
Since the beginnings of the Afghan refugee crisis, aid agencies have provided 
consistent and substantial relief to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. However, the 
response was framed by the assumption that mostly short-term humanitarian aid is re-
quired because refugees will return to Afghanistan once the conflict ends. This report 
challenges the “conflict-refugee” concept by focusing on refugee agency in the face of 
human insecurity and the complexity of Afghan population movements, which include 
transnational networks, mixed migration, and hybrid identities.  
The discussion concentrates on the period from 2002 to 2005, when UNHCR fa-
cilitated sizable surges of voluntary returns while the Afghan state was still in the initial 
reconstruction phase. Regardless of UNHCR’s repatriation program, the refugee crisis 
persisted as a significant number of repatriates decided to return to Pakistan and Iran or 
cross the border repeatedly. To explain the causes and consequences of this phenomenon 
of refugee backflows, I offer the following argument: The backflow of repatriated refu-
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gees consisted of both voluntary and forced migrants. Voluntary migrants continued ex-
isting practices of circular migration to pursue their preferred livelihood strategies. 
Forced migrants, however, responded to human insecurity in Afghanistan with migratory 
coping strategies as their only available form of agency.  
This distinction has several implications for future reconstruction and repatriation 
efforts: On the one hand, reconstruction plans should integrate the potential constructive 
effects of voluntary migration. These effects include remittances, the transfer of human 
capital, as well as the reduction of pressures on the labor market, infrastructures and so-
cial services in the transitional state. On the other hand, UNHCR should only facilitate 
repatriation once a minimum level of human security on all levels is guaranteed to ensure 
safe and dignified returns and prevent continued forced migration.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 1978, Afghanistan has experienced a series of complex emergencies, fueled 
by armed conflict, ethnic persecution, and humanitarian crises. To escape chronic vio-
lence and insecurity, large waves of Afghan refugees repeatedly fled to the neighboring 
states Pakistan and Iran where they have been living in refugee camps, settlements, and 
urban areas. Until today, the Afghan refugee crisis remains one of the largest protracted 
refugee situations (PRS) worldwide. 
Since the beginnings of the Afghan PRS, aid agencies have provided consistent 
and substantial relief to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. However, the response was 
framed by the assumption that mostly short-term humanitarian aid is required because 
refugees will return to Afghanistan once the conflict ends. This report challenges the 
“conflict-refugee” concept by focusing on refugee agency in the face of human insecurity 
and the complexity of Afghan population flows, which include transnational networks, 
mixed migration, and hybrid identities. 
The discussion concentrates on the period from 2002–2005, when the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) facilitated sizable surges of voluntary 
returns while the Afghan state was still in the initial reconstruction phase. Regardless of 
the repatriation program, the refugee crisis persisted as a significant number of Afghan 
refugees decided to return to Pakistan and Iran or cross the border repeatedly. While 
some scholars have argued that UNHCR’s repatriation program was premature,1 others 
maintained that the backflow of returnees “is merely an indication that Afghans are con-
                                                
1 Turton, David, and Peter Marsden. Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Af-
ghanistan. Issue Paper Series, Islamabad: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2002, 20. 
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tinuing to do what they have always done.”2 While both perspectives deserve merit, this 
report emphasizes that it is crucial to acknowledge the thin line between voluntary and 
forced migration.  
To explain the causes and consequences of the phenomenon of refugee backflows, 
I offer the following argument: The backflow of repatriated refugees consisted of both 
voluntary and forced migrants. Voluntary migrants continued existing practices of circu-
lar migration to pursue their preferred livelihood strategies. Forced migrants, however, 
responded to human insecurity in Afghanistan with migratory coping strategies as their 
only available form of agency.  
The distinction between voluntary and forced migrants has several implications 
for future reconstruction and repatriation efforts: On the one hand, reconstruction plans 
should integrate the potential constructive effects of voluntary migration. These effects 
include remittances, the transfer of human capital, as well as the reduction of pressures on 
the labor market, infrastructures and social services in the transitional state. On the other 
hand, UNHCR should only facilitate repatriation once a minimum level of human securi-
ty on all levels is guaranteed to ensure safe and dignified returns and prevent continued 
forced migration.   
To support this argument, the report addresses the following research questions: 
1) To which extent did the transitional state and external actors meet the human security 
needs of Afghan returnees? 2) How did UNHCR manage the repatriation and reintegra-
                                                
2 Kronenfeld, Daniel A. "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not 
Necessarily Afghan?" Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 1 (2008), 56; Monsutti, Alessandro. "Afghan Mi-
gratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem." Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 1 
(2008), 59. 
 
3 UNHCR Population Statistic Database 
4 Klein, Betsy, Laura Koran, and Eric Bradner. Obama Halts Afghanistn Troop Withdrawal. March 24, 
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tion of Afghan refugees?  3) Why did repatriates decide to leave Afghanistan? 4) How 
sustainable was UNHCR’s facilitated voluntary repatriation program? 
The report is structured as follows: In chapter 2, I critically discuss the key con-
cepts and issues, which frame the research questions of this report – durable solutions to 
protracted refugee situations, forms of and opportunities for refugee agency, and the role 
of human security in post-conflict reconstruction. The chapter discusses the current de-
bates among scholars and practitioners, how these concepts interact with each other, and 
in which ways this report seeks to contribute to each discussion. 
In chapter 3, I discuss how three decades of violence and conflict in Afghanistan 
created repeated refugee movements. I then examine the progress of the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005 with an in-depth analysis of human security in this 
period. In a third step, I investigate Afghan refugees’ mixed transnational migration as 
one form of refugee agency. This section of chapter 3 provides insights into the role of 
transnational networks, the experience of migration, and issues of access and vulnerabil-
ity. It is important to provide this context because refugee agency does not take place 
within a vacuum, but needs to be understood with reference to refugees’ broader social-
economic and security environments.  
Chapter 5 turns to UNHCR’s facilitated voluntary repatriation program as I dis-
cuss how refugees have used migratory strategies to respond to the limitations of the re-
patriation program. This chapter brings together the main elements of this report: 
repatriation, reconstruction, human security, and refugee agency. I seek to find out if 
there is a relationship between human security and refugees’ decision to migrate. Chapter 
6 summarizes the main findings and offers policy recommendations.   
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1.2. RELEVANCE 
The main justification for this project lies in the intrinsic importance of the Af-
ghan refugee crisis as one of the world’s most complex, most intractable, and largest PRS 
with a magnitude of human consequences. Even though UNHCR, nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), and state actors have tirelessly worked on relieving the plight of ref-
ugees and providing the Afghan people with livelihood opportunities, traditional 
humanitarian frameworks and policies have been unsuccessful in resolving the crisis. At 
any point in time since the beginning of the 1980s there have been at least 1.9 million 
displaced people living in Pakistan and Iran. In January 2015, there were still 1.47 mil-
lion Afghans refugees and asylum seekers residing in Pakistan and 950 000 in Iran.3 
The current withdrawal of United States (U.S.) troops from Afghanistan – alt-
hough recently slowed down4 – poses additional risks for displaced persons and return-
ees. As of now, it remains unclear whether the Afghan reconstruction project will be 
successful enough to provide safe returns for the remaining refugees still residing in Pa-
kistan and Iran. The recent advances of the Taliban in Kunduz also point to the risk that 
the Taliban might be able to resurge once international forces have left Afghanistan.5 A 
Taliban revival would undoubtedly prompt renewed refugee movements across both bor-
ders. Against this background, researching alternative policy solutions to the Afghan ref-
ugee crisis remains a crucial endeavor, even as the current situation of Afghan refugees is 
gradually improving. 
                                                
3 UNHCR Population Statistic Database 
4 Klein, Betsy, Laura Koran, and Eric Bradner. Obama Halts Afghanistn Troop Withdrawal. March 24, 
2015. 
5 Mashal, Mujib, and Jawad Sukhanyar. "Afghan Troops Rush to Kunduz Amid Taliban Assault." New 
York Times, April 28, 2015. 
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Although each refugee crisis is unique in many ways and therefore requires indi-
vidualized policy responses, the Afghan crisis is also indicative of certain dynamics typi-
cal of the present humanitarian system, such as: mixed migration, limitations of the cur-
current refugee definition, aid fatigue, the militarization of aid, and the relief-
development gap. The Afghan case therefore contains important lessons for humanitarian 
actors and the international community to be able to respond to future refugee crises and 
complex emergencies more effectively. The report sheds light on the limitations of the 
three durable solutions and contributes to current debates about state reconstruction. 
Finally, this report seeks to negotiate the perspectives, experiences, and agencies 
of a variety of actors: refugees, migrants, aid workers, policy makers, and members of 
host communities. It is important to depart from the widespread perception that refugees 
are merely victims and beneficiaries of aid. As of now, the humanitarian system does not 
give a strong voice to its main constituents, which can be seen in the limitations and in-
flexibility of the current durable solutions framework. This report foregrounds the inno-
vative potential of human agency and seeks to navigate both the realities and limitations 
of policy-making and the inventiveness and resilience of the Afghan people. 
1.3. METHODS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
I apply an actor-oriented research approach by focusing on human agency, partic-
ularly refugees’ migratory strategies. The notion of agency conceptualizes refugees as 
“social actors who process their own experiences and those of others while acting upon 
these experiences.”6 While voluntary migration is an obvious expression of choice either 
                                                
6 Essed, Philomena, Georg Frerks, and Joke Schrijvers. "Introduction: Refugees, Agency and Social Trans-
formation." In Refugees and the Transformation of Societies: Agency, Policies, Ethics and Politics, edited 
by Philomena Essed, Georg Frerks and Joke Schrijvers. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004, 2. 
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on the individual or household level, forced migration indicates a “tension between agen-
cy and compulsion.”7 Refugees therefore act within the limitation set by conflict and per-
secution, institutional restrictions imposed by UNHCR and host governments, as well as 
norms and expectations of their own community as well as the host society. However, as 
this report will illustrate many Afghan refugees have been able to carve out space for 
agency both within and beyond these boundaries. Examples of human agency the Afghan 
refugee communities are formal and informal entrepreneurial activities, shifting roles of 
female household members, political organization within refugee camps, recruitment of 
“refugee warriors,” and migratory strategies – the focus of this report. 
Afghan refugees have used migratory strategies to escape conflict, access natural 
resources (water, arable land), pursue seasonal labor, spread risks, maintain land, assets 
and personal relationships, access higher quality education and health care, send remit-
tances, and receive UNHCR assistance packages. As every refugee experiences flight, 
encampment and repatriation differently, the actor-oriented approach of this report is a 
way to dismantle generalizations and stereotypes. In its place, investigating refugee agen-
cy highlights the dynamic and transformative nature of social relationships, constructed 
identities, and livelihood strategies.  
Ideally, this project warrants original multi-sited ethnographic research, which un-
fortunately is beyond the scope of the report. The analysis mainly draws on case studies 
initiated by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the UNHCR Policy De-
velopment and Evaluation Service, as well as surveys sponsored by the UN Development 
Programme, the World Bank Group and the Asia Foundation. Aware of the potential in-
                                                
7 Stigter, Elca. "Afghan Migratory Strategies - An Assessment of Repatriation and Sustainable Return in 
Response to the Convention Plus." Refugee Survey Quarterly 25, no. 22 (2006), 110. 
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stitutional biases inherent to secondary source research, I seek to give refugees and mem-
bers of host communities a voice wherever I have access to their recorded accounts.   
There are several distinct difficulties in working with refugee data. The main 
challenge lies in the narrow refugee definition, which technically excludes people fleeing 
environmental and economic instabilities and does not reflect the complex identities of 
migrants and refugees. Refugee registration numbers are also notoriously unreliable as 
many families do not register all of their members and there is a lack of data on refugees 
living in urban areas. Facilitated repatriation programs also brought about a range of data 
issues, as some refugees repatriated several times to benefit from the financial and mate-
rial support provided by UNHCR.8 In general, it is important to keep in mind that refugee 
numbers are being politicized by host governments, the Afghan government, humanitari-
an organizations, and donors – all of which pursue their own political objectives.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 For an in-depth discussion of issues of counting Afghan refugees see Kronenfeld, "Afghan Refugees in 
Pakistan." 
9 Loescher, Gil, and James Milner. "Understanding the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations." In Pro-
tracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications, edited by Gil Loescher et al. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008, 22. 
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2.  Key Concepts 
This chapter outlines four key concepts, which frame the research topic of this re-
port: Protracted refugee situations, repatriation as a durable solution, forms of and oppor-
tunities for refugee agency, and the role of human security in state reconstruction. The 
chapter discusses the current debates among scholars and practitioners, how these con-
cepts interact with each other, and in which ways this report seeks to contribute to each 
discussion.  
2.1. PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS 
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugees are individuals forced to 
flee their country to escape war, persecution, or severe limitations of their personal free-
dom. In this sense, the term “refugee” distinctly differs from the term “migrants” or those 
who choose to leave their home country, not out of fear, but out of hope for a better life 
for themselves and their families. However, the realities of complex emergencies,10 
where multiple interrelated factors, such as political and physical violence, diseases, hun-
ger, and displacement, lead to large-scale human suffering, blur the lines between mi-
grants and refugees. 
 In complex emergencies, people move across borders for a variety of humanitari-
an reasons that fall outside the traditional refugee conception, challenging the narrow pe-
rimeters of the conflict-refugee definition. This report uses the term “mixed migrants” to 
                                                
10 There is an ongoing scholarly debate about how to define “complex emergencies” as they are character-
ized by multiple interconnected elements that function as both causes and symptoms. The humanitarian 
impact of such crises can be further exacerbated by natural disasters and the incapability of the local gov-
ernment to deliver relief. Complex emergencies are therefore often connected to some level of state failure 
or even collapse. For an in-depth analysis of complex emergencies see Keen, David. Complex Emergen-
cies. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. For an overview of definitions see Albala-Bertrand, Jose Miguel. 
"Complex emergencies versus natural disasters: An analytical comparison of causes and effects." Oxford 
Development Studies 28, no. 2 (2000): 187-204. 
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conceptualize these overlapping experiences and identities of migrants and refugees.11 
Mixed migration refers to forms of mobility that transgress the binary criteria of regular 
and irregular as well as forced and voluntary movements. Governments generally seek to 
“disaggregate and manage” mixed migration flows, and often put pressures on humanitar-
ian actors to do the same.12  
Today, a vast majority of refugees live in protracted refugee situations, in which 
refugees exist in a “state of limbo” lasting more than five years. Even though they may 
no longer fear for their lives, “their basic rights and essential economic, social, and psy-
chological needs remain unfulfilled.”13 This state of limbo is most pronounced for asylum 
seekers who “occupy neither a fully legal nor illegal position of nonbelonging.”14 In the 
Afghan PRS, both Pakistan and Iran officially did not accept Afghan refugees based on 
the Refugee Convention, but as mohajirin – those who seek asylum for religious reasons.   
Commonly, PRS evoke images of immobile and passive populations, warehoused 
in large-scale camps or settlements and largely dependent on material aid. However, the 
reality of PRS is much more complex as refugees identify ways to maintain their liveli-
hoods on their own terms and membership of PRS constantly changes as refugees repat-
riate, new families arrive, and others move to third countries.15 In the Afghan case, as in 
                                                
11 In response to the limitations of the refugee definition Martin et al. introduced the term “crisis migrants,” 
which the authors define as “all those who move and those who become trapped and are in need or reloca-
tion in the context of humanitarian crises.” See Martin, Susan F., Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor, . 
Humanitarian Crisis and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses. New York: Routledge, 2014, 
12. 
12 Linde, Thomas. "Mixed Migration - A Humanitarian Counterpoint." Refugee Survey Quarterly 30, no. 1 
(2011), 89. 
13 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. "Protracted Refugee Situations." June 
10, 2004.  
14 Cabot, Heath. "The Governance of Things: Documenting Limbo in the Greek Asylum Procedure." Polit-
ical and Legal Anthropology Review 35, no. 1 (2012), 17. 
15 Loescher & Milner, "Understanding the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations," 21. 
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many other PRS, refugees live not only in UNHCR administered camps but also in urban 
areas and refugee villages. Scholars have shown that the type of settlement not only in-
fluences refugees’ livelihood strategies, but also their construction of national belonging, 
identity, and future outlook.16 
As most protracted refugee situations are hosted by developing countries, PRS are 
easily seen as further complicating already existing development problems. As a result, 
host countries tend to restrict refugees’ movement, employment opportunities, and access 
to public services, such as health care and education. Pakistan and Iran have been hesitant 
to provide integration support fearing that “more development-oriented investments 
would discourage rather than enable repatriation.”17  At the same time, there is a lack of 
donor involvement with host countries, reinforcing the perception that refugees constitute 
a burden and security concern for host communities.18  
At the onset of a crisis, donors readily provide resources to help. However, as ref-
ugee situations become protracted, donor fatigue sets in and resources begin to dwindle. 
Donor fatigue occurs because the enduring refugee crisis requires consistent immediate 
relief that exceeds the budget of emergency funding lines. By providing only what is ab-
solutely necessary, donors frame assistance as a recurring expense rather than an invest-
ment in the future. Refugees and returnees therefore often fall into the “relief-
                                                
16 For instance, Malkki discovered that for Hutu refugees living in organized camps in Tanzania their “ref-
ugeeness” was a central element of individual and group identity. Hutu refugees living in townships, on the 
other hand, adopted hybrid, cosmopolitan identities reflecting their connection to both Burundi and Tanza-
nia. See Malkki, Liisa. "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National 
Identity among Scholars and Refugees." Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992), 35-36. 
17 Macleod, Ewen. "Afghan Refugees in Iran and Afghanistan." In Protracted Refugee Situations: Politi-
cal, Human Rights and Security Implications. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008, 346. 
18 Loescher & Milner, "Understanding the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations," 27.
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development gap,”19 a systematic lack of funding for transitional and development-
oriented in fragile states. As this report will show, Afghan refugees who took part in 
UNHCR’s repatriation program were facing human insecurity precisely because they did 
not receive the necessary transitional aid.  
Restricted in their access to employment and receiving insufficient external sup-
port for local integration, refugees can become dependent on subsistence-level assis-
tance.20 Refugees in a PRS must therefore often rely on finite external assistance from 
humanitarian organizations and host governments to meet their basic human needs. The 
term “aid dependency” has definite shortcomings, as it is often used to blame aid recipi-
ents rather than uncover institutional causes. Donors have used the aid dependency argu-
ment to justify cuts in humanitarian relief. This report argues that to reduce aid 
dependency, donors should increase transitional and development-oriented aid in addition 
to relief. The aid dependency discourse also simplifies the complex realities of refugees’ 
lives and perpetuates the image of refugees as passive victims. It does not take into ac-
count non-traditional and informal livelihood strategies, such as transnational migration.  
2.2. REPATRIATION – A DURABLE SOLUTION? 
UNHCR pursues three durable solutions for refugee crises: local integration, re-
settlement, and repatriation. The potential for local integration is generally limited be-
cause host countries are typically poor and still in the developing stage themselves. If 
                                                
19 The two systems of humanitarian and development aid have different historical backgrounds and are still 
considered separate fields by most donors and implementing organizations. However, contrary to this sepa-
ration, humanitarian crises do not occur in isolation but rather concurrently with existing development 
needs. To conceptualize this disconnect between humanitarian and development efforts, researchers and 
practitioners speak of a “relief-development gap.” See Steets, Julia. "Donor Strategies for Addressing the 
Assistance Gap and Linking Humanitarian and Development Assistance. A Contribution to the 
International Debate." Final Report. June 9, 2011. 
20 Loescher & Milner, "Understanding the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations," 31. 
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local integration is not successful, the PRS can create conflictual situations and insecuri-
ty.21 On its own, resettlement in third countries is generally considered an impractical so-
lution to mass displacement due to the sheer numbers of refugees that would need to be 
resettled. In addition, countries of asylum have been increasingly closing their borders 
over the past decades due to post 9/11 security concerns, the blurring of immigration and 
asylum, and negative public opinions about foreigners.22  
Since local integration and resettlement are only pursued for less than 1% of the 
global refugee population,23 repatriation has been the preferred solution to refugee situa-
tions. UNHCR cannot enforce repatriation at any point but can facilitate returns by 
providing transportation, support kits, and limited financial assistance. UNHCR only ac-
tively promotes voluntary repatriation when the situation in the country of origin permits 
safe and dignified return. Specific pre-conditions to ensure returnees’ safety and dignity, 
are the right to basic livelihood, legal safety, as well as basic economic and social rights, 
all of which allow the returnees to re-establish themselves.24 
In certain post-conflict situations, UNHCR facilitates returns because parts of the 
origin country are considered safe, while fighting might still be ongoing in other areas. 
However, repatriation to transitional states comes with significant challenges. According 
                                                
21 UNHCR. Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern. May 2003, 4. 
22 Troeller, Gary. "Asylum Trends in Industrialized Countries and their Impact on Protracted Refugee Situ-
ations." In Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications. Tokyo: Unit-
ed Nations University Press, 2008, 43-44; It is important to note that all three durable solutions are 
interrelated. Even though the report does not explicitly address this issue, the fact that resettlement numbers 
are relatively low compared to the high burden shared by developing host countries around the world con-
siderably hinders the overall success of the durable solutions framework. 
23 Chimni, B. S. "Post-conflict Peacebuilding and the Return of Refugees: Concepts, Practices, and Institu-
tions." In Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State, 
edited by Edward Newman and Joanne van Selm. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003, 195 
24 Ziek, Marjoleine. "Voluntary Repatriation: Paradigm, Pitfalls, Progress." Refugee Survey Quarterly 23, 
no. 3 (2004), 53. 
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to Koser and Black,25 returnees to post-conflict states face four main challenges: 1) phys-
ical problems, such as landmines and destroyed infrastructures, 2) limited access to key 
resources, such as land and labor, 3) social confrontation with local communities, and 4) 
marginalization of already vulnerable groups. While most returnees experience these four 
challenges to some degree, different variables, such as human capital, access to social 
networks and financial assistance, can facilitate the reintegration process.  
The durable nature of the three durable solutions implies that refugees cannot only 
return, stay, or resettle, but can actually (re-)establish themselves.26 Integration in the host 
community or origin state requires development assistance in terms of housing, social 
and religious support, and employment. However, UNHCR is not explicitly mandated to 
conduct development programs to ensure the long-term establishment of integrating and 
returning refugees.27 In addition, scholars and practitioners have paid little attention to 
refugees’ experiences after return.28 By studying the livelihood strategies of Afghan refu-
gees before and after repatriation, this report addresses this policy and research vacuum.  
Another challenge of repatriation as a durable solution is ensuring that returns are 
truly voluntary. By initiating the Afghan repatriation program, UNHCR was responding 
to internal and external pressures from asylum countries, Afghanistan’s interim govern-
                                                
25 Koser, Khalid, and Richard Black. "The End of the Refugee Cycle?" In The End of the Refugee Cycle? 
Refugee Repatriation & Reconstruction, edited by Richard Black and Khalid Koser. New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1999, 10-11. 
26 Ziek, "Voluntary Repatriation: Paradigm, Pitfalls, Progress," 46. 
27 UNHCR attempted to extend its mandate with the 2003 Framework for Durable Solutions that includes: 
Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR), Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruc-
tion (4Rs), and Development through Local Integration (DLI). 
28 For a chronological exploration of research done on repatriation and reconstruction see Preston, Rose-
mary. "Researching Repatriation and Reconstruction: Who is Researching What and Why?" In The End of 
the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction, edited by Khalid Koser and Richard Black, 
18-37. New York: Berghahn Books, 1999. 
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ment, the U.S., and its allies. Refugees are often motivated to return by pressures coming 
from the host government and society, inaccurate promises of reconstruction assistance, 
as well as the fear of becoming part of UNHCR’s residual caseload and thereby losing 
protection status.29 Against this background, unsustainable returns illustrate the difficulty 
of balancing UNHCR’s two core mandates of assistance and protection.30  
2.3. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMAN SECURITY 
Countries emerging from conflict, such as Afghanistan post-2001, face a wide 
range of political, physical, economic, and social reconstruction challenges. However, the 
notion of post-conflict reconstruction remains an elusive ideal seeing that it takes most 
transitional states years to reach a post-conflict stage. The post-conflict concept does not 
capture the “gray areas between war and peace,” which include ongoing tensions, insecu-
rity and institutional failure. It therefore encourages transitional states to ignore these 
continuing problems and instead highlight their post-conflict nature so as not to be la-
beled a failed state.31 The concept also invites the assumption that reconstruction and de-
velopment occur in temporal stages. In this context, scholars have focused on a narrow 
definition of physical security as the necessary requirement for all other reconstruction 
and development efforts.32 This approach has proven problematic because emerging 
states face a complex set of human insecurities that cannot all be addressed through mili-
tary intervention alone.  
                                                
29 Ziek, "Voluntary Repatriation: Paradigm, Pitfalls, Progress," 43-44. 
30 UNHCR. Global Consultations on International Protection/Third Track: Voluntary Repatriation. April 
25, 2002, 7. 
31 Shneiderman, Sara, and Amanda Snellinger. Framing the Issues: The Politics of "Post-conflict". March 
24, 2014.  
32 See for instance Call, Charles T. "Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of 
Law in El Salvador." Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (2003), 827. 
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) introduced the term “hu-
man security” in its 1994 Human Development Report. The encompassing concept of 
human security connects security, relief, and development goals (see table 1). Compared 
to the traditional security concept, which defines security in military terms from a state 
perspective, human security focuses on individual experiences and vulnerabilities.33  
Table 1: Human security components and indicators 
Component Definition34 Indicators 
Economic  
security 
Assured basic income from pro-
ductive and remunerative work or 
a publicly financed safety net. 
Unemployment rate; population below 
poverty line; opium economy 
Food  
security 
Physical and economic access to 
basic food. 
Food deficit; cereal import dependency 
ratio; % of children under 5 with malnu-
trition, stunting, wasting & underweight 
Health  
security 
Freedom from disease and infec-
tion, as well as access to health 
services. 
Maternal and infant mortality rates; dis-
ease burden; % of rural population in 
coverage area of basic health facilities 
Environmental 
security 
Resistance to acute and chronic 
environmental threats, such as 
water scarcity, desertification, 
droughts, and floods, etc. 
% of population with access to safe wa-
ter; % of population with access to ade-
quate sanitation 
Personal  
security 
Security from physical violence 
and threats, such as torture, war, 
ethnic tensions, crime, rape, etc. 
Number of civilian deaths; number of at-
tacks; prevalence of landmines; number 
of landmine victims 
Community  
security 
Security from violence, threats 
and discrimination based on 
membership in a community (of 
ethnicity, gender, religion, etc.). 
Qualitative assessment of violence, 
threats and discrimination against vulner-
able groups 
                                                
33 UNHCR. "Human Security: A Refugee Perspective" - Keynote Speech by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the 
"Lysoen Process" Group of Governments, Bergen, Norway, 19 May 1999.  
34 Definitions are based on UNDP. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994, 25-33. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Political  
security 
State’s respect for all individu-
als’ basic human rights and 
freedoms. 
Freedom in the World score; Freedom 
of the Press rank 
While post-conflict reconstruction should ultimately turn into sustainable devel-
opment, we can measure short-term reconstruction progress based on levels of human 
security. In the context of refugee crises, human security is a useful indicator to deter-
mine whether an emerging state is ready for refugee repatriation. That is because human 
security is an important first step towards sustainable human development: “People 
whose conditions of life are above this minimal level [of human security] may live in 
comparatively undeveloped circumstances, but have a basic level of security that allows 
them to plan and work for a better future.”35  
In a 1999 speech titled “Human Security: A Refugee Perspective” former UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata36 described the link between repatria-
tion, reconstruction, and human security: 
The international community must pay much closer attention, and much 
more coherent support to societies emerging from conflict. Peace-building 
in the period immediately following the end of conflicts is a very weak link 
in the international cooperation system, although it is a vital one, since it 
connects conflict resolution with development efforts. I am very concerned 
by the gap which currently exists between humanitarian intervention dur-
ing conflicts, and the beginning of long-term development programmes. 
We are particularly worried about this gap because very often recently re-
turned refugees are among those who suffer most from the lack of re-
sources available to build peace. This in turn does not help preventing the 
recurrence of conflict and of refugee flows. 
                                                
35 Gutlove, Paula, Gordon Thompson, and Jacob Hale Russell. "Health, Human Security, and Social Re-
construction in Afghanistan." In Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Expe-
rience, edited by John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. Rondinelli. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 
197. 
36 UNHCR, Human Security: A Refugee Perspective. 
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We can extract several implications from Ogata’s speech: 1) Human security lives 
at the intersection of state and aid responsibilities. On the one hand, ensuring security is 
the primary obligation of the government, but on the other hand transitional states very 
much depend on the aid and development community to create human security. 2) Issues 
of human security can fall into the “relief-development gap.” 3) Returnees are among the 
most vulnerable populations to be affected by human insecurity. Even though Ogata indi-
cated in 1999 already that the concept of human security is acutely relevant to refugee 
situations, UNHCR and other UN agencies have since made little effort to integrate hu-
man security into refugee assistance and protection.37 This paper addresses this lack of 
attention by investigating the connection of human insecurity and refugee backflows.  
2.4. REFUGEE AGENCY AND MIGRATION 
The durable solutions framework is rooted in the notion of citizenship-restoration 
through resettlement, repatriation, or local integration, of which repatriation has been 
largely uncontested as the preferred policy. The modern nation state system demands that 
any person’s main mode of identification is her or his citizenship status. However, the 
nation-state focus of the refugee regime leaves little space for acknowledging refugees’ 
traditions of regional and internal migration, tribal affiliations, and daily livelihood strat-
egies. These strategies may transgress the borders of the two prevailing authorities in ref-
ugees’ lives - the nation state and the humanitarian system - as refugees often harness 
transnational networks and ties with the host community at the local level.38  
                                                
37 For instance, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) was launched in 1999, but 
it lacked a conceptual framework and was not used for repatriation and reintegration assistance.  
38 Mattner, Mark. "Development Actors and Protracted Refugee Situations: Progress, Challenges, Oppor-
tunities." In Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications, edited by 
Gil Loescher et al. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008, 111. 
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Recognizing refugee agency inevitably means departing from the notion of refu-
gees as dependent victims. That is because in the course of their flight and resettlement, 
refugees bring with them and acquire skills, assets, and networks. But even if the ideas of 
complete dependency and victim status are flawed, it is important to acknowledge that 
“refugees’ new identities, increased capacities, awareness, and assertiveness come with a 
price: these changes are born in trauma, bereavement, loss, exclusion, and the pain of not 
belonging, due to attributed ‘otherness.’”39  
In refugee situations, socio-spatial forms are not necessarily reproduced but newly 
established.40 The experience of flight does not only produces trauma and vulnerability, it 
also enables refugees to negotiate social spaces, assert themselves and develop hybrid 
identities. For instance, in the comparatively open societies of Pakistan and Iran, many 
Afghan women have been able to take on stronger roles in their families and advocate for 
their own as well as their children’s education and health care. Risk-taking behavior pro-
vides another link between displacement and renewal. Even though security risks in their 
home country drive refugees to flight, any form of unsettlement is also a form of risk-
taking behavior.  
Against this background, Laura Hammond rethought the language of repatriation 
and reconstruction by challenging the “assumption that it is desirable and possible for 
returnees to regain that which they had before becoming refugees.”41 Common terms 
used in the repatriation context, such as reintegration, reconstruction, and reestablish-
                                                
39 Essed, Frerks & Schrijvers, "Introduction: Refugees, Agency and Social Transformation," 12. 
40 Agier, Michel. Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2011, 53. 
41 Hammond, Laura. "Examining the Discourse of Repatriation: Towards a More Proactive Theory of Re-
turn Migration." In The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation & Reconstruction, edited by Kha-
lid Koser and Richard Black. New York: Berghahn Books, 1999, 225. 
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ment “imply that by reentering one’s native country a person is necessarily returning to 
something familiar.”42 However, repatriation and reconstruction do not only involve the 
undoing or redoing of previous structures, but consist mostly of new challenges and pro-
cesses. Hammond therefore proposes the terms construction, creativity, and innovation to 
describe the potential for social change engendered in the repatriation process.43  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
42 Ibid., 230. 
43 Ibid., 243. 
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3. Human Insecurity, Reconstruction, and Migratory Strategies 
This chapter outlines how three decades of conflict and violence in Afghanistan 
produced repeated refugee movements to Pakistan and Iran. The chapter then examines 
the progress of the Afghan reconstruction project and levels of human security in Af-
ghanistan post-2001. Finally, the discussion turns to the phenomenon of Afghans’ mixed 
transnational migration between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. It explores the nature 
and implications of this form of refugee agency as it unpacks why and how Afghan refu-
gees engage in mixed transnational migration.  
3.1. LEGACY OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE44 
Since 1978, Afghanistan has experienced a series of armed conflicts, resulting in 
decades of violence on the hands of Soviet forces, the Mujahedin, local militia, the Tali-
ban, terrorist networks, and foreign military forces. Internal ethnic, religious, and political 
divisions and Afghanistan’s historical role as a “buffer state” between competing empires 
largely motivated these conflicts.45 Over the course of three decades of war, the Afghan 
people suffered through disappearances, torture, mass executions, ethnic persecution, 
which led to internal displacement and mass migrations to Pakistan and Iran. Every Af-
ghan has been affected by the protracted conflict in some way. According to a survey by 
the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), almost 70% of respond-
ents said that they or an immediate family member have been subject to serious human 
rights abuses during the war.46 
                                                
44 Some of the key writers on Afghanistan’s contemporary history and society not cited in this section in-
clude: Louis Dupree, Frédéric Grare, Nancy Hatch-Dupree, Hassan Kakar, Olivier Roy, Amin Saikal, Con-
rad Schetter, and M. Nazif Shahrani. 
45 Trueman W. Sharp et al. "Challenges and Opportunities for Humanitarian Relief in Afghanistan." Clini-
cal Infectious Diseases 35, no. 5 (2002), 217. 
46 AIHRC. "A Call for Justice." January 2005, 45. 
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With every regime change, the new powers to be based their legitimacy on their 
efforts to defeat the previous abusive regime. Each new regime promised to bring about 
some sort of societal improvement, be it land reform, restoration of Islamic values, or 
democracy. However, each new regime wound up undercutting these claims by abusing 
its power and repressing its opponents. This cycle of violence and oppression began in 
1978, when the communist coup in Afghanistan brought the People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA) to power. Even though the PDPA attempted to promote women’s 
education and redistribute land equitably, the regime also committed some of the worst 
atrocities in Afghan history, including mass executions. A prominent example of the bru-
tal legacy of PDPA rule is the massacre of 1,170 boys and men in Kerala village in 
Kunar.47  
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to counter the immi-
nent collapse of the PDPA regime. Even though mass executions declined under Soviet 
rule, illegal arrests, torture, and killings of civilians were still common. The indiscrimi-
nate violence by the Soviets created mass movements of refugees and internally displaced 
persons to the extent of “migratory genocide.”48 The Soviet invasion produced the largest 
populations displacement in Afghanistan’s history with 2.5 million people fleeing to Pa-
kistan and 1.5 million to Iran.  
The two states responded to the refugee influx in different ways. Even though Iran 
had ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and both Protocols, the government did not 
base its acceptance of refugees on the requirements of the international refugee regime. 
                                                
47 Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Tali-
ban. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, 57. 
48 Ibid., 60-61. 
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The new government argued that it was not bound by international documents signed by 
the ousted monarchy. Instead, it granted refugees and guest workers the status of mohajir, 
or one who seeks asylum for religious reasons. Teheran thereby distanced itself from in-
ternational influence on its refugee and immigration policies. Accepting Afghans as mo-
hajirin also provided Teheran with room to change its policies in the future.49  
Pakistan was never party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocols, but still 
ended up hosting one of the world’s largest refugee populations. Zia became the host of 
mohajirin par excellence as he emphasized the cultural and religious kinship of Afghans 
and Pakistanis. In this time-frame, Afghan refugees in Pakistan had three coexisting iden-
tities: First, to UNHCR and other relief organization they were refugees according to the 
Convention. Second, they enjoyed Pashtun hospitality (melmastia) according to the pash-
tunwali code of honor. Third, their host states considered Afghan refugees mohajirin 
based on the Islamic concept of seeking asylum from religious persecution.50 
While the second and third identities both imply positive host-refugee relations, 
they also introduced tensions. The acceptance of refugees based on religious grounds was 
temporally limited as a mohajir can easily turn into an unwelcome guest once a refugee 
situation becomes protracted. The refugees arriving in Pakistan were not only Pashtuns, 
but also Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. So, while Pashtuns were welcomed with melmastia 
as part of pashtunwali, members of other ethnic groups enjoyed less hospitality.51 Fur-
                                                
49 International Crisis Group. "Afghanistan: What Now for Refugees?" Asia Report, no. 175 (August 
2009), 3. 
50 Centlivres, Pierre, and Micheline Centlivers-Dumont. "The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous 
Identity." Journal of Refugee Studies 1, no. 2 (1988), 143-145. 
 
51 So, Yamane. "The Rise of New Madrasas and the Decline of Tribal Leadership within the Federal Ad-
ministrated Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan." In The Moral Economy of the Madrasa: Islam and Education 
Today, edited by Sakurai Keiko and Fariba Adelkhab. Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 23. 
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thermore, the younger generation of Afghan refugees was very susceptible to Islamic 
ideologies including the concept of jihad.  Newly established madrassas in refugee camps 
became the site of radicalization and religious indoctrination through which many refu-
gees assumed the identity of refugee warriors (mohajir-mujahed). Students and mullahs 
from Punjab, Kashmir, as well as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries, came to 
these madrassas to teach and learn about Islamist ideologies. Many students of these radi-
calized madrassas were later recruited to join the Mujahedin and Taliban.52 
UNHCR and other relief organizations struggled with these complementary and 
overlapping identities of Afghan refugees. The refugee definition according to Pashtun-
wali is incompatible with fair and equal distribution of aid as it implies ties of depend-
ence. Also, it was difficult for UNHCR to clearly identify fighters from expatriate victims 
due to the conflation of the mohajir/mujahed identity.53 Zia, on the other hand, exploited 
the conflated identities of mohajirin and mujahedin to support militant groups fighting 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Under Zia, Islamist factions received financial and military 
assistance through the government’s Afghan Desk, religious parties, and the international 
community. The groups leading the anti-Soviet insurgency were thus able to increasingly 
militarize and control Afghan Refugee villages and camps located in Pakistan’s North 
Western Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, and Federal Administrated Tribal Area 
(FATA).54  
As the young generation of Mujahedin and mullahs expanded their leadership 
from madrassas to become increasingly influential in local communities, they started to 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Centlivres & Centlivers-Dumont, "The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan," 143-145. 
54 International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan: What Now for Refugees?" 4. 
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clash with the more conservative tribal authorities and local administrations. The newly 
emerging leaders were heavily armed, controlled aid flows and were perceived to disre-
spect the tribal code and local traditions.55 As a result, the formerly respectful and sup-
portive relations between host communities and refugees became increasingly charged.   
From 1988 to 1992, the Soviet-backed Najibullah government defended its rule 
against the Mujahedin and local militia. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and 
Russia stopped its financial assistance to the state, the Mujahedin gained control of Kabul 
in April 1992. With the overthrow of the Najibullah government Afghanistan finally saw 
its first large scale return of refugees after the Soviet invasion. However, inter-factional 
fighting between different groups seeking power over the country led to a renewed civil 
war and left Kabul destroyed.56 Each faction had its own ethnic base and systematically 
targeted civilians of other ethnicities as revenge or extortion.57 The fighting – in many 
ways even bloodier than the Soviet war – caused a new exodus of refugees and IDPs.58 
One horrific example is the February 11, 1993 massacre of Hazara civilians in the Afshar 
neighborhood of Kabul, in which Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i-Islami troops are reportedly respon-
sible for mass executions, disappearances, and rape.59 
The radical Taliban movement, backed by the Bhutto government and Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),60 took advantage of the infighting, recruited large parts 
                                                
55 So, "The Rise of New Madrasas," 23-24. 
56 Ruttig, Thomas. Dossier innerstaatliche Konflikte: Afghanistan. March 18, 2014.  
57 Gossmann, Patricia. "Truth, Justice and Stability in Afghanistan." In Transitional Justice in the Twenty-
First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, 255-277. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 258. 
58 Kronenfeld, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," 47. 
59 Gutman, Roy. How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghani-
stan. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 222. 
60 Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. New 
York: Routledge, 2005, 145-155; Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghani-
stan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009, 240. 
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of the population, and gradually took over Kabul. By 1996, the Taliban controlled the rest 
of Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban had a corroding impact on Afghan society. The 
regime curtailed women’s freedoms in all aspects of their lives. Most prominently, the 
Taliban deprived women of access to education, health care, clean water, and sanitation. 
As a result, Afghan girls and women were facing not only significant physical but also 
mental health problems.61  
The Taliban also gravely discriminated against ethnic minorities to the point of 
using them as human minesweepers on battlefields north of Kabul. By September 1998, 
the Taliban were engaging in open ethnic cleansing of Hazara Shia. Compared to the ref-
ugee movements during the Soviet invasion, it was mostly members of ethnic minorities 
and the educated, urban middle-class who fled the Taliban insurgency. The situation in 
Afghanistan was further exacerbated by drought and economic decline. At the same time, 
former refugees became an important part of the Taliban movement: “Although the pre-
dominantly Pashtun group counted among its ranks a number of Mujahedin commanders 
from the anti-Soviet jihad, the foot soldiers of the Taliban were mainly young men 
brought up in exile in Pakistan’s refugee camps and educated in madrasas.”62  
The Taliban regime also embarked on a unique Islamization campaign by forcing 
the population to adhere to the social norms of Southern Pashtun tribal areas.63 The re-
gime’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice enforced these 
social norms. Violators were tried based on sharia law and often had to face traditional 
                                                
61 Iacopino, Vincent. The Taliban's War on Women: A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan. 
Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 1998, 49-50. 
62 International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan: What Now for Refugees? " 4. 
63 Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless War, 120. 
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hudud punishments, which include stoning, amputations, live burials, and flogging.64 
Overall, the human rights abuses and crimes committed by the Taliban regime further 
exacerbated already deeply entrenched ethnic, religious, and political divisions in Afghan 
society.  
As large numbers of Afghans, mainly Kabulis, sought exile in Iran and Pakistan, 
the two host countries became increasingly impatient with the situation. Both govern-
ments sent clear signals that Afghans had overstayed their welcome. In Pakistan, the gov-
ernment reduced assistance to refugee camps and Iran treated new arrivals as illegal 
aliens with limited rights.65 By then, Iran and Pakistan exhibited “acute asylum fatigue.” 
Teheran refused to register new arrivals and by 1998 started detaining and deporting Af-
ghans. Having backed the Taliban financially and militarily, Islamabad deemed continued 
exile unjustified. In both countries, public opinion of Afghan refugees declined and Af-
ghans were often accused of contributing to unemployment and criminality.66 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 produced the forth wave of Afghan displacement. 
Anticipating a U.S. led military retaliation against the Taliban regime for harboring Osa-
ma Bin Laden, large numbers of Afghans attempted to flee especially from the main cit-
ies. By the end of 2001, 25% of Kabul’s population, 50% of Kandahar, and 65% of 
Jalalabad had left the cities.67 However, by then the two host countries had already re-
stricted their acceptance policies. As a result, those who were not able to cross the border 
                                                
64 Ibid., 123. 
65 International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan: What Now for Refugees?" 4. 
66 Ibid., 4-5. 
67 Auswärtiges Amt. "Bericht der Bundesregierung u ̈ber die deutsche humanita ̈re Hilfe im Ausland 2002 
bis 2005" 2006, 55. 
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became part of Afghanistan’s 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).68 Once the 
Northern Alliance, U.S. and allied forces advanced and the interim government took con-
trol of Kabul, UNHCR initiated measures to support the return of refugees and IDPs.69 
3.2. RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMAN SECURITY POST-2001 
By 2001, the legacies of incompetent Soviet governance followed by Taliban rule 
had rendered Afghanistan a failed state par excellence. The Afghan government had 
grinded to a halt with a budget of less than 1% of its GDP and the economy had col-
lapsed, making Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. Years of civil war 
and the U.S. invasion devastated Afghanistan’s infrastructure, undermined its rule of law 
and created an almost anarchical security environment. In March 2002, a UN report listed 
eight areas of reconstruction highlighting the range of Afghanistan’s human security 
needs:  
1) Improvement of security to expand humanitarian access 
2) Food and nutrition aid, especially in drought-affected, inaccessible, and rural areas 
3) Provision of health services, in particular immunization campaigns 
4) Clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance 
5) Rebuilding physical infrastructure 
6) Assistance to returning refugees and IDPs 
7) Emergency relief for natural disasters, particularly earthquakes and landslides 
8) Curbing poppy cultivation70 
 However, actual reconstruction plans were not based on realistic needs-
assessments, but were instead supply- and interest-driven. While Afghanistan had been 
unstable for decades, the U.S. and its allies only became actively involved “when insta-
                                                
68 UNDP. "Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004." 2004, 117; Qadeem, Mossarat. "Af-
ghanistan: The Long Way Home." In Internal Displacement in South Asia: The Relevance of the UN's 
Guiding Priniciples, edited by Paula Bannerjee et al. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005, 39. 
69 Auswärtiges Amt. "Bericht der Bundesregierung," 55. 
70 UN Security Council. "The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and 
Security." March 18, 2002.  
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bility in Afghanistan began to bleed into insecurities for the Western world.”71 This nar-
row definition of insecurity, which focuses on threats posed by terrorists and the Taliban, 
guided the international response. Dismantling terrorist networks, removing the Taliban, 
and installing a new government became the priorities of the intervention, while most 
other security and development challenges remained secondary.  Table 2 illustrates that 
from 2001-2006, reconstruction efforts did not create the levels of human security neces-
sary for dignified and sustainable refugee returns. 
                                                
71 UNDP, "Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004," 8. 
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Table 2: Human security in Afghanistan (2001-2006) 
Component Indicator  Qualitative assessment and Afghan’s self-perception based on Asia Foundation’s Survey of the Afghan People (2006) 
Economic  
security 
Unemployment rate 
(2004) 
Estimated 25%  After 2001, economic indicators, such as GDP and growth rate signifi-
cantly improved. Overall, 50% reported their economic fortune was bet-
ter than under Soviet occupation. However, there are regional disparities 
in people’s perception of economic fortune: More people in urban set-
tings and Northern regions (63%) than in rural areas and Eastern & 
South Western regions (32-36%) reported being more prosperous. 
Despite the economic growth and increased prosperity, unemployment 
and widespread poverty persisted. Across all ethnicities and regions, 
respondents stated employment as their most important issue. Another 
source of economic insecurity is the prevalence of Afghanistan’s opium 
economy. Those respondents in favor of poppy cultivation (20%) stated 
that it is more profitable than other crops, labor rates are higher, and 
poppy crops need less water. 
Population below poverty 
line (2003) 
 
53% 
Opium economy (2004) 38.2% of official 
GDP 
Food  
security 
Depth of food deficit 
(kcal/capita/day 2004) 
292 kcal One of Afghanistan’s major sources of insecurity is insufficient availa-
bility, access, stability and utilization of food. The country shows rela-
tively high values in all common indicators of food insecurity. 2003 
brought some agricultural improvements with good rain and high har-
vest, but in 2004 continuous drought, the destruction of irrigation facili-
ties and the spread of plant diseases resulted in low yields. The resulting 
long-term food insecurity has had a detrimental impact on people’s 
health. Especially in children under 5, under- or malnourishment can 
have devastating effects on their cognitive and physical development.  
Cereal import dependen-
cy ratio (2004) 
20.8% 
% of children under 5 
with malnutrition (2004) 
10% acute, 50% 
chronic  
 % of stunted, wasted & 
underweight children un-
der 5 (2004) 
59.3% stunted 
8.6% wasted 
32.9% underweight   
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Table 2 (continued) 
Health 
security 
Maternal mortality rate 
(2004) 
1,600/100,000 live 
births 
Health insecurity of the Afghan people has been a direct function of en-
vironmental and food insecurity, most importantly the lack of safe water 
and stable food supplies. In addition, the emerging Afghan state did not 
rebuild a functioning health care system. In 2004, a large percentage of 
Afghanistan’s poor and rural population had limited to no access to 
basic health care. The high infant and maternal mortality rates are a re-
sult of a lack of female health professionals as well as limited access to 
reproductive care. However, positive achievements towards health secu-
rity can be seen in successful immunization campaigns. For instance, by 
2002 measles immunization coverage reached 80%.  
Infant mortality rate 
(2004) 
165 deaths/1,000 
live births  
Disease burden (number 
of new cases in 2004) 
Tuberculosis: 
72,000  
Malaria: 2-3 mil. 
% of rural population in 
coverage area of basic 
health facilities (2002-03) 
Badghis: 33% 
Herat: 60% 
Kabul: 87% 
Kandahar: 63% 
Nangarhar: 43% 
Environ-
mental  
security 
% of population with ac-
cess to safe water (2004) 
23% (18% rural, 
43% urban) 
Lack of access to adequate water and sanitation has produced a range of 
insecurities for Afghans. For instance, in Afghanistan there is a high 
correlation between the percentage of the population without sanitation 
and the child mortality rate. Lack of water supply for irrigation also re-
duces agricultural output and therefore food security. Across all ethnici-
ties and regions, respondents stated access to safe drinking water as 
their second most important issue.  
Further sources of environmental insecurity were air pollution, defor-
estation, unstable energy supply, and insufficient disaster preparedness. 
In several provinces, forest coverage has been reduced by up to a half 
since 1977, increasing the likelihood of landslides after earthquakes.  
% of population with ac-
cess to adequate sanita-
tion (2004) 
12% (28% rural, 
6% urban) 
Personal  
security 
Number of insurgency 
and terrorist attacks 
2001: 13; 2002: 38 
2003: 154; 2004: 
88; 2005: 155 
 Afghans have been facing a variety of personal security threats includ-
ing military and terrorist attacks, landmines, torture, extortion, and kid-
napping. While respondents did not list personal insecurity as their most 
 
31 
Table 2 (continued) 
Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Asia Foundation, World Bank Group, United Nations Development 
Programme, Global Terrorism Database, The Nation’s interactive database of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Freedom House
 Number of civilian deaths 
(low and high estimates) 
2001: 1,181-3,126 
2002: 78-114 
2003: 43-49 
2004: 21-41 
2005: 24 
important issue, they identified security as the biggest problem facing 
Afghanistan as a whole. There were some regional and ethnic disparities 
in the perception of personal security: Respondents from southern and 
eastern provinces felt more insecure than those from northern and north-
western provinces. More Pashtuns (75%) than other ethnicities reported 
fear for personal or family safety. This may be due to the fact that the 
majority of fighting happened in the Pashtun belt. Even though military 
activity by coalition forces and between rival local power holders con-
tinued, the number of estimated civilian deaths rapidly decreased after 
2002. At the same time, the number of insurgency and terrorist attacks 
rose from 13 in 2001 to 155 in 2005. People may not have been directly 
affected by these military and terrorist attacks. However, their unpre-
dictability and resulting constant fear are equally traumatizing sources 
of personal insecurity.  
 % of rural Afghans living 
among landmines and 
unexploded ordnance 
(2003) 
Badghis: 13% 
Herat: 17% 
Kabul: 62% 
Kandahar: 7% 
Nangarhar: 24% 
 Number of landmine vic-
tims (2003) 
676 injured        
184 killed 
Community  
security 
Ethnic violence, particularly directed against Pashtuns in areas of northern Afghanistan dominated by Uzbeks and Tajiks, 
has led to large-scale internal displacement. Connected to ethnic tensions are disputes over land-rights between nomads 
and IDPs and local authorities. A positive development is that 90% of respondents agreed that everyone should have equal 
rights under the law regardless of gender, ethnicity, and religion. However, more urban respondents (96%) than rural re-
spondents (89%) agreed to equal rights.  
Political  
security 
Freedom in the World 
score (2004)          
(1=best, 7=worst) 
Not Free 
Freedom: 6 
Civil Liberties: 6 
Political Rights: 6 
Despite of the process of democratization, Afghanistan was still one of 
the least free countries in the world. While people’s responses reflected 
the low Freedom House indicators, they also showed significant region-
al variations in freedom of political expression. In the southwestern re-
gion, only 25% felt free to express political opinions, while 63% felt 
free in the Central-Kabul region. Men enjoyed more political freedom 
than women. People did not feel free to express political opinions due to 
bad security conditions and the presence of warlords and the Taliban.  
Freedom of the Press 
rank (2004) 
Not Free 
Rank 159 of 193 
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In order to effectively address Afghanistan’s human security needs, international 
actors would have had to use the period immediately following the U.S. invasion – also 
termed the “golden hour” – to make extensive investments in the eight reconstruction ar-
eas. According to Jones and Rubin, these investments would have had to be on a “Mar-
shall Plan” level, be long-term oriented and focus on building the capacity of the Afghan 
state and civil society.72 However, at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which ini-
tiated the process of Afghanistan’s political reconstruction, the UN and the Bush admin-
istration instead promised a “light footprint.”73 The goal of this light footprint was to 
prevent problems of aid dependency, brain drain, and other adverse pressures due to an 
influx of Western aid workers. Yet, the local population, government officials, as well as 
aid workers have all shared their frustrations with the insufficient level of foreign aid 
provided for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.74  
To boost the Afghan economy, the Western donor states embarked on a large-
scale effort of heavily investing in Afghanistan’s financial institutions and introducing a 
new currency. These investments were relatively successful and even led to an economic 
boom in the country.75 To some extent, the aid community also showed progress in their 
reconstruction efforts.76 Even so, growth and improvements in human development were 
neither sustainable nor did they affect all areas of Afghanistan equally. For instance, 
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while Herat was prospering, the area surrounding the city remained stagnating with little 
employment opportunities and no investments in local industries.77 This example shows 
that large amounts of aid and foreign investment do not equal human development, just 
as economic growth does not necessarily reach all parts of society. 
Overall, three factors significantly undermined the reconstruction of Afghanistan: 
1) the urgency of short-term relief due to the ongoing complex emergency, 2) insufficient 
focus on capacity-building of the Afghan state and civil society, and 3) insufficient atten-
tion to rebuilding the Afghan security forces. All three factors contributed to the unsus-
tainability of Afghan growth and development as well as persistent security issues. The 
Afghan government’s inability to stabilize the security environment as well as wide-
spread public frustrations with the insufficient progress in rebuilding the country ulti-
mately enabled the Taliban insurgency to regain its strength in 2005.  
From 2001 to 2005, frequent natural disasters, including droughts, floods, and 
earthquakes, and lasting conflict continued to cause substantial humanitarian needs 
throughout the country.78 As reconstruction aid had to be diverted to acute relief, it was 
lacking in long-term development. This relief-development gap affected a wide range of 
crucial human security and development areas, such as replacing poppy cultivation with 
sustainable agriculture, strengthening government institutions, fostering human capital, 
investing in disaster risk management, and supporting the integration of returning refu-
gees and displace persons.  
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The Bush administration’s “light footprint” approach did not only result in limited 
development aid, it also included what Rashid calls America’s “warlord strategy.”79 Ac-
cording to the author, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense 
(DOD) used U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to patronage 
warlords by contracting out infrastructure projects worth millions of dollars. Warlords 
used these cash injections to further mobilize their militia.80 While warlords are part of 
Afghanistan’s complex and traditional forms of hierarchy, authority, and patronage, using 
aid to reinforcing existing power divisions violates the humanitarian principle of neutrali-
ty.81 By coopting USAID programs, the CIA and DOD militarized aid and blurred the 
lines between legitimate humanitarian action and a military campaign. This militarization 
of aid and proliferation of a warlord state had grave implications for the reconstruction 
efforts as militia commanders increased corruption, violated human rights, and spread 
insecurity.82 It also undermined all efforts of the Karzai government to empower civil so-
ciety and tribal leaders to rebuild their communities.  
For many years, Afghanistan has been reliant on relief and development agencies 
for vital services, such as providing food and health care. While aid agencies have always 
been facing logistical and financial difficulties in Afghanistan, under the Taliban regime 
and during the U.S. invasion aid workers were also confronted with problems of limited 
humanitarian access.  After 9/11, over 100 international agencies working in critical re-
construction areas decided to evacuate their foreign staff.83 Their security concerns 
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ranged from hijacked ambulances, ransacked food warehouses, to the threat of coalition 
attacks.84 For instance, after continued threats, insecurity and the killing of five staff 
members, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) withdrew from Afghanistan in 2004 with the 
following statement: 
MSF denounces the coalition’s attempts to co-opt humanitarian aid and 
use it to win hearts and minds. By doing so, providing aid is no longer 
seen as an impartial and neutral act, endangering the lives of humanitari-
an volunteers and jeopardizing the aid to people in need.85 
Institutional reform was one of the priorities of the Bonn Process, but the progress 
made in this area was incremental at best. Italy and Germany were designated lead coun-
tries in the areas of judicial reform and police reform respectively. However, within the 
larger reconstruction project both reform efforts trailed far behind. Even five years into 
the transitional period, the Afghan public had still very little confidence in the judiciary, 
as judicial corruption seemed widespread. The police force appeared to enjoy impunity as 
officers frequently resorted to torture and other abusive interrogation methods.86 
The U.S. and the international community could have mitigated all these limita-
tions. Member states never met the UN’s global appeals for funding and even the insuffi-
cient funds pledged at the Tokyo conference in 2002 were not paid fully into the 
Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund. In Turton and Marsden’s study,87 many Afghan re-
turnees, but also government officials and UN and NGO staff, expressed their disap-
pointment at the level of help being provided for reconstruction in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, these funds were never earmarked for long-term reconstruction, which made it 
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easy to divert the money to acute relief and put development efforts on hold.88 Similarly, 
instead of paying off warlords and perpetuating their rule, the U.S. could have made a 
long-term investment in rebuilding and empowering the Afghan state, especially its judi-
ciary, security forces, administration and ministries, and its civil society.   
3.3. MIXED TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AS A COPING STRATEGY 
In the course of decades of armed conflict, Afghans have become vulnerable to 
human insecurity on all levels. Most Afghan families have lost loved ones and assets, 
faced environmental shocks, had to flee violence, and have lived in poverty. However, 
the Afghan people have demonstrated their resilience through their own agency and cop-
ing strategies. They have coped with and survived these crises by adjusting and diversify-
ing their livelihood strategies.  
In the past, Afghans have used a variety of coping strategies, including: reducing 
food consumption, selling assets, moving to urban areas, migrating to neighboring coun-
tries, sending family members to work in the Gulf states, Europe or North America, send-
ing and receiving remittances, negotiating with armed forces, diversifying income 
through subsistence farming or wage labor, and forming strategic family alliances.89 
Families choose these coping strategies depending on their access to land, markets, infra-
structure, and social networks.  
A family’s initial crisis response focuses on meeting most basic needs, such as 
food, shelter, clothing, and medicine. Beyond that, Afghan families also pursue “wider 
indicators of well-being, such as a dignified absence of poverty and social values such as 
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freedom, choice and self-esteem.”90 Complex emergencies have introduced not only vio-
lence but a wide range of vulnerabilities for the Afghan people. Afghans therefore aspire 
to achieve not only a narrow version of physical security, but also human security and 
development. These aspirations and existing coping skills at the individual, family, and 
community level can be invaluable assets in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and develop-
ment efforts.  
 
Migratory Networks 
One way Afghans have coped with human insecurity is mixed transnational mi-
gration within the region. Transnational migration is not a new phenomenon, but has 
been part of Afghan traditions for centuries. The long history of migration from and 
through Afghanistan includes merchants who used the Silk Road between China and the 
Mediterranean, pilgrims on their way to Indian and Middle Eastern sites of worship, 
mountain people seeking employment in urban centers, and nomads who annually move 
their herds and flocks to better grazing land.91 It is therefore not surprising that many ref-
ugees continued to migrate after their initial flight, throughout their time of displacement, 
and even after their repatriation to Afghanistan. 
Over the past decades, Afghan refugees have woven efficient migratory networks 
based on back and forth movements and the dispersion of members of their kin groups 
between Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and beyond. In the context of refugee situations, the 
notion of migratory networks is rooted in the understanding that refugees are not mere 
victims but agents who respond to human insecurity by using their social and cultural re-
sources. Mixed transnational migration refers to people who can be labeled or identify 
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themselves as both labor migrants and refugees, and their migratory circuits are often 
multidirectional.92 Monsutti, who has done extensive research on Afghan refugees and 
transnational migration, defines transnational networks of Afghan refugees as follows:  
Through the continuous circulation of people, money and commodities, as 
well as information, Afghans who are spread across a range of locations 
remain linked. These transnational networks, constituted by people inter-
acting and cooperating with each other across international frontiers, can 
make a crucial contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 93 
Afghans have maintained their transnational networks through remittance systems 
(hawala), which facilitate the transfer of money and goods between family members liv-
ing in different parts of the world. Beyond material and financial objects, transnational 
networks also circulate workers and women as brides. Many households in Afghanistan 
rely on remittances, which makes sending family members abroad one of their most im-
portant livelihood strategies. While Afghanistan does not report remittances to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, it is estimated that over 31% of all Afghan households receive 
remittances from Iran or Pakistan and total remittances from abroad accounted for 29.6% 
of Afghanistan’s GDP in 2006.94  
To send remittances, Muslims across the world use formal and informal hawala 
dealers who transfer money through a “trust-based network of agents.”95 Hawala systems 
are not only cheaper than other forms of international money transfer, but they are also a 
long-cultivated Afghan tradition. In recent years, these traditional networks have become 
even stronger with the emergence of mobile technology that enables remittance senders 
and receivers to stay in contact with hawala agents and track transfers.  
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After 9/11 the transnational hawala system has become one of the main objects of 
suspicion regarding terrorism financing. Muslims living in the West have been using in-
formal hawala dealers to channel not only personal funds but also charitable contribu-
tions to their native countries, where donations are often needed the most.96 With 
increased anti-terrorism restrictions for the non-profit sector, U.S. and international regu-
lators have charged several Islamic charities of using Islamic banking systems to launder 
terrorist money.97 In the current regulatory environment, mobile Muslims are therefore 
quickly suspected of using traditional remittance systems for terrorism financing.     
Remittance systems – while certainly beneficial for the receiving household – can 
present a significant burden on migrant workers. Migrants who were sent to live in urban 
areas in Pakistan, Iran or the Gulf states often live in dire economic situations themselves. 
As these workers also have to maintain their own families, many find it difficult to meet 
the high financial expectations of other relatives living in Afghanistan. Often, remittances 
are not high enough to be used as long-term investments, but instead only suffice to de-
fray the costs of a household’s most basic needs, such as food and clothes.98 As a result, it 
would be too optimistic to expect remittances to significantly contribute to Afghanistan’s 
long-term economic development. Monsutti speaks of short-term benefits that reconfirm 
a “self-perpetuating cycle without cumulative effects.”99 However, it is important to keep 
in mind that without remittances many Afghan families would be forced to live in hunger 
and extreme poverty.  
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Through transnational networks, neighboring cities on each side of the Afghan 
border to Pakistan and Iran have developed close economic and cultural ties. For in-
stance, the two cities Kandahar and Quetta are connected through regular and irregular 
trade, much of which consists of back-and-forth transactions of small items, such as 
watches, cooking oil, and blankets. The Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 
reports that many traders and smugglers use their regular trips across the border to main-
tain personal ties by visiting relatives in both countries.100  
Networks based on kinship, tribe and religion do not only facilitate migration and 
produce economic opportunities, but can also provide physical security for migrants. In 
the case of Hazara refugees and migrants in Quetta, in the mid-1980s many Shia Hazaras 
have experienced violence due to tensions with Sunni Pashtun groups. While the tensions 
between the two groups never completely faded, Afghan Hazaras were able to settle in 
Hazara Town and Marriabad, where they sought the protection of local Hazaras.101    
Interdisciplinary scholarship on transnationalism provides useful frameworks and 
approaches to further conceptualize the migratory networks of Afghan refugees. Econo-
mists and sociologists have approached transnational migration by focusing on questions 
of incorporation, the impact on the labor market, push and pull factors, and demographic 
changes.102 In response to these largely economic arguments, anthropologists and area 
scholars have expanded the field of transnationalism by exploring migrant narratives, the 
construction of transnational communities and identities, and the blurring of national and 
state boundaries. 
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Instead of characterizing Afghans in Pakistan and Iran as “uprooted,” a more fit-
ting description would be “transmigrants […] whose daily lives depend on multiple and 
constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are 
configured in relationship to more than one nation-state.”103 Transnational networks 
therefore suggest that Afghan communities have not exactly formed “diaspora identities,” 
which would rely on a single motherland as main point of reference. Instead, we can ob-
serve the development of “pluri-local” transnational identities through which Afghans 
produce cultural meaning in relation to multiple socio-spacial points of reference.104  
Refugees’ transnational identities not only affect their crisis response, but also 
their integration in the host community as well as their reintegration in Afghanistan after 
return. Especially for second-generation refugees, the notion of “home” is highly ambiva-
lent. Home and homeland have to be understood as more than an “essentialized point on 
the map,”105 but rather a place where people feel safe, to which they have not only a con-
nection on paper, but also emotional ties. A 22-year old female home-based teacher who 
grew up in Teheran but repatriated to Afghanistan describes her complex ties to Iran and 
Afghanistan as follows: 
It’s true that now I’m relaxed and free [in Herat]. Still, I don’t forget Iran 
and want to visit Iran every year. Because my past life and memories are 
in Iran. [...] I like Afghanistan very much as well. But there is no memory 
in Afghanistan, because I grew up in Iran. [...] I feel that I’m an Afghan 
but in real, I feel sometimes that I’m a hybrid.106 
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Motivations and Causes 
When refugees use their transnational networks in the face of human insecurity, 
motivations and causes for migration often overlap. A family may leave Afghanistan to 
seek protection from persecution and violence, but will choose a particular destination in 
Pakistan so that working members of the family can seek employment. In this case, the 
nature of the refugee family’s social network may influence the decision to move to 
Peshawar instead of Islamabad. In this sense, “decisions and considerations of refugees 
may not be very dissimilar to those of other (migrant) groups in society.”107  Reducing 
refugees’ considerations to traumatic experiences alone oversimplifies the complex reali-
ties of their decision-making process.  
Mobility may also become more relevant over time as refugees’ needs and priori-
ties shift from immediate survival to education, employment, health care, and cultural 
interests. Refugees may choose to migrate to another city or state in order to access dif-
ferent livelihood strategies and meet these new priorities. These shifts have been espe-
cially pronounced when refugees decide to or are forced to leave a UNHCR camp to 
settle in urban areas. 
In interviews conducted by the AREU, Afghan refugees have mentioned various 
reasons for engaging in transnational migration between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran 
ranging from cross-border trade, visiting relatives, seasonal labor, to attempted repatria-
tion. Many refugees use migration as a way of spreading risks within one or between sev-
eral households. Similar to transnational migration, risk-spreading strategies have long 
been a coping mechanism in Afghan families. In agrarian societies, households rely on 
large families with strong kinship bonds to diversify income and prepare for external 
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shocks, such as the illness of an income-generating family member or crop losses due to 
droughts.108  
Afghan families pursue similar risk-spreading strategies through mobility. Within 
one social network, elder and younger members may stay in refugee camps to access so-
cial services, while others return to Afghanistan to look after the family’s land and assets. 
A family may send its most mobile members to move further abroad to send remittances, 
while others will engage in circular migration patterns between Pakistan, Iran and Af-
ghanistan to pursue seasonal labor.109 Mixed transnational migration is therefore part of a 
larger system of risk-spreading.  
Power Relationships and Mobility 
Power relationships between members of refugee communities and within refugee 
households have an effect on their levels and control of mobility. Scholars have concep-
tualized the distinct relationship between power and mobility highlighting that even for 
highly transnational communities mobility is not limitless.110 Especially in patriarchal 
societies, male family members’ privilege of mobility may further entrench the immobili-
ty of female members. Similarly, older family members may only be able to exercise the 
decision to stay in Afghanistan by compelling younger members to become migrant 
workers and send remittances. While power relationships may render a person more or 
less mobile, they may enable other expressions of individual agency. McNay reminds us 
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that to arrive at a nuanced understanding power and female agency, scholars need to take 
into account women’s creative and productive strengths: 
With regard to gender, a more rounded conception of agency is crucial to 
explaining both how women have acted autonomously in the past despite 
constricting social sanctions and also how they may act now in the context 
of processes of gender restructuring.111  
In the Afghan context, gender plays an important role in determining a person’s 
mobility. Only those who have access to migration, which for the most part means young 
men, can actively use it as a livelihood strategy. However, less mobile family members 
can benefit from the mobility of others through remittance systems. Also, while women 
are relatively less mobile, the mobility of male members of a household can open up oth-
er forms of female agency that do not involve mobility. In the absence of men, Afghan 
women have assumed more domestic responsibilities and taken individual action by start-
ing to work, completing errands, and making important family decisions. Especially in 
Iran, Afghan women have bent gendered hierarchies in their families to reflect the more 
modernized role of women in Iranian society.112  
Mobile responses may also be less relevant for young children, the elderly, and 
persons with medical vulnerabilities. Based on families’ risk-spreading strategies, mobili-
ty is less relevant for an only child or son who is unlikely to be allowed to migrate. In the 
Afghan context, access to mobility is often determined within the realms of family hier-
archies. In these cases, mobility indicates not only agency of the migrant but also of other 
family members who influenced the decision. The following is a description of the hier-
archical kinship relations within a mobile work team in Teheran: 
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Yusuf, 40, is the foreman and has extensive experience migrating to Iran 
(he has been involved in the hawala business and in people smuggling in 
the past); Karim, 20, Ysuf’s late brothers son; Hanif, 24, from another lin-
eage but from the same hamlet as Yusuf; Mohammad Jan, 21, Hanif’s 
rother, married to a partenal cousin of Yusuf; Husain Ali, 19 unmarried, 
from the same lineage of Hanif and Mohammad Jan (their fathers are dis-
tant paternal cousins); Habibullah, 19, unmarried, from the same lineage 
as Yusuf, but originating form another hamlet; Abdullah, 18, unmarried, 
family originates from the same district as Yusuf (but he was born in Paki-
stan and had never been to Afghanistan).113 
 In this vignette, there is a clear hierarchy between the supervisor, who is not only 
older but more experienced, and all other members of the work team. While experience 
and age difference structure the division of labour in this group, the members are brought 
together through different direct and indirect relations with each other. The fact that one 
team member has no kinship ties to the rest of the group shows that social networks are 
fluid and diverse in that they can be based on “different sources of solidarity.”114  
Finally, refugees’ socioeconomic status and social capital determine whether mi-
gration is a possible livelihood strategy. Refugees with the necessary social capital have 
access to information, logistical support, language skills, and personal connections that 
make migration a viable livelihood strategy. Since Pakistan and Iran have increasingly 
restricted cross-border movements, migration has become more expensive. To cross the 
border in both directions, Afghan refugees need the financial resources to cover a wide 
range of expenses, such as transport, bribes, smugglers, and identification papers.115 Be-
fore migration helps refugees improve their livelihoods, they have to be able to take risks 
and make significant investments. 
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Experiences and Challenges of Migration 
Numerous obstacles stand in the way of Afghans intending to go to Iran or Paki-
stan:116 The governments frequently close official border crossing for long periods of 
time. Also, for the majority of migrants from rural areas it is almost impossible to obtain 
the necessary documentation to legally cross the border. Applicants for passports have to 
travel to major cities and show proof of citizenship, financial support and no criminal 
record. After decades of war and especially in rural areas, many people have either lost or 
never received any formal records.   
Yet, Afghan refugees have still been able to pursue migratory strategies because 
the borders between Afghanistan and the two host states are relatively porous. That is be-
cause border officials on both sides have never been able to successfully control cross-
border traffic.117 Additionally, particularly in Pakistan many Afghans live close to their 
home provinces in Afghanistan, making informal migration seem more feasible. As a re-
sult, many Afghans resort to crossing borders illegally, without formal documentation. 
For the majority, this means relying on smuggling networks, particularly to cross 
the Iranian border. Traveling across the Iranian border is highly risky because of bandits 
and Iranian police officers, who can arrest and deport undocumented migrants. Smug-
glers sometimes act as a source of credit for migrants. In these cases, upon arrival mi-
grants are immediately recruited as forced labor to repay their debt. Irregular migrants 
therefore risk losing their freedom because they can be taken “hostage” by large-scale 
traffickers. The following narrative of a border-crossing from Afghanistan to Iran in the 
1990s illustrates the distressing experience of being smuggled across the border: 
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The smugglers brought a couple of Toyotas. It was 6am; each Toyota was 
crammed with 20-25 people. The roads were bad. […] There are always 
thieves in those mountains, because the Baluch themselves know that a 
certain number of people will be passing through that day. […] There 
were three or four smugglers in all, surrounding the migrants on all sides, 
on all four sides, and ahead were the Baluch guides. […] If the migrants 
made some noise, they beat them mercilessly, beat them with sticks. So, it 
was very dangerous.  
When we left the mountain we ran a lot. At night, when it was really dark, 
we slept before starting the journey again. […] A couple of Toyotas ar-
rived; there were a hundred and fifty of us. Fifty people left, in those two 
Toyotas; they set off for Zahedan… It was seven in the evening when the 
first migrants were taken…the rest of us waited and we stayed there until 
one in the morning. It was cold, there was no water, and we were very 
hungry. Sometimes people stayed a whole day in the undergrowth, and 
some died of hunger and thirst.118  
However, these stories about the experiences of deportation and trafficking do not 
seem to deter others from crossing the border. Even those intercepted and arrested often 
try to cross again. Regardless of the dangers and negative experiences, migrants continue 
to pursue transnational migration for different reasons: in response to human insecurity, 
to meet high financial expectations of relatives or because they may have taken on addi-
tional debt to enable the first trip.119  
In addition to personal insecurity, irregular migration can also endanger refugees’ 
legal status. That is because mobile refugees occupy a legal limbo as authorities can con-
sider them undocumented migrants. However, as both Pakistan and Iran never accepted 
Afghan refugees under the 1951 Convention, their legal status never fully existed. As a 
result, compared to other protracted refugee situations, migration is a relatively more via-
ble coping strategy for Afghan refugees.    
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The preceding analysis of Afghan refugees’ migratory strategies reveals that mo-
bility enables Afghans to respond to human insecurity in both familiar and new ways. 
Transnational migration between the three countries not only expanded refugees’ liveli-
hood options, but also helped them forge transnational identities that reflect their unique 
relationship with both their “home” and their “host” states. At the same time, we have to 
acknowledge that different factors challenge and undermine these constructive aspects of 
mobility: 1) Not every refugee has access to migratory strategies. 2) Irregular migration 
often means giving up agency and risking personal security. 3) Expectations to send re-
mittances can put significant economic and emotional pressures on migrant workers.     
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4. Repatriation, Reconstruction, and Refugee Agency 
This chapter analyzes UNHCR’s facilitated voluntary repatriation program for 
Afghan refugees between 2002 and 2005. The program was severely limited both in con-
ceptual and practical terms – UN officials and policymakers did not take into account 
how the fragility of the Afghan state, the lack of human security, and the prevalence of 
mixed transnational migration would affect the repatriation program. UNHCR has played 
a vague role in improving certain elements of human security to support reintegration. At 
the same time, refugees have used migratory strategies to respond to human insecurity in 
Afghanistan, which resulted in significant refugee backflows.  
4.1. FACILITATED VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
In 2002, UNHCR signed two Tripartite Agreements with Afghanistan and each 
host state, which emphasize voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution. The 
agency started facilitating repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan on 1 March 
2002 and from Iran on 9 April 2002. Beyond the Tripartite Agreements, UNHCR also 
encouraged non-neighboring states to offer the option of voluntary returns. While 
UNHCR only anticipated 400,000 returnees within the first year,120 in 2002 alone over 
1.9 million Afghan refugees took part in the repatriation program. During the first year, 
most returnees were short-staying refugees who had fled during the Taliban period and 
the U.S. invasion.121 After 2002, return numbers decreased significantly, with less than 
645,000 returnees from both countries in 2003. However, by then many long-term refu-
gees decided to take part in the repatriation program.122  
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Fig. 1: Afghans repatriated by UNHCR from Pakistan and Iran (2002-2006) 
 
Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database 
Three developments illustrate that the agency facilitated voluntary returns to Af-
ghanistan prematurely. First, by July 2002 UNHCR was already struggling to fund its 
repatriation program with a US$ 65 million deficit making up almost 30% of the total 
estimated operation costs. As a result, the agency had to halve the number of shelter kits 
and reduce financial and material returnee packages.123 Second, UNHCR had to disrupt 
its return plans several times due to continued violence and insecurity in several areas of 
Afghanistan.124 Third, the fact that UNHCR considerably underestimated how many Af-
ghans would want to repatriate indicates that the agency could also not fully consider the 
sustainability of such large-scale returns.  
Given the lack of funding and continued insecurity in Afghanistan, why did 
UNHCR facilitate repatriation only few months after the U.S. invasion? It is important to 
recognize that UNHCR makes decisions regarding refugee returns in highly politicized 
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environments, in which different institutional actors seek to realize their political objec-
tives. For the government of Afghanistan, repatriation was a vote of confidence, validated 
the success of its state-building and reconstruction efforts, and gave the Transitional Ad-
ministration political leverage. The U.S. and its allies could use large-scale repatriation as 
an ex-post justification for the military campaign against the Taliban. For the two host 
governments, successful repatriation meant responding to domestic pressures by reducing 
the perceived unfair burden Afghan refugees represented. 125  
In addition, UNHCR decided, “the time is now right for Afghans […] to be of-
fered the option of repatriation” at a time when several non-neighboring states, such as 
Australia and the United Arab Emirates, were already returning Afghan asylum seekers. 
On 10 July 2002, UNHCR stated in a note regarding returns to Afghanistan from non-
neighboring states that in many of the claims “related to the rule of the Taleban, […] in-
ternational protection is no longer an issue.”126 In the case of Australia, the Immigration 
Minister immediately referred to this statement in order to justify the return of seven Af-
ghan asylum seekers.127 Beyond responding to these external pressures, UNHCR was al-
so motivated by the fact that a successful repatriation program would increase the 
agency’s status in the international community and justify future pleas for funding.128  
Determining the motivations of returnees is more difficult because the Afghan 
refugee population is highly diverse. It includes both short-term and long-term refugees 
who have fled Afghanistan for a variety of reasons over the course of several decades. 
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Refugees would also repatriate with various forms of social and economic capital ranging 
from the educated urban elite to the rural poor. We have to acknowledge that different 
factors may influence the decision to return. Refugees’ decision-making process is not 
only based on cost-benefit analyses, but also driven by a deeper longing to return to the 
“home” country. Finally, decisions to move are usually made on the household level or 
even on the level of whole groups of families. This is especially likely in the “old camps” 
in Pakistan, to which whole villages have moved during the Soviet invasion and the civil 
war. In these camps, traditional leadership hierarchies still considerable influence house-
hold decisions.129  
Even considering complex decision-making processes, it is still intriguing why so 
many Afghan refugees decided to repatriate in 2002 even though conflict was still ongo-
ing and human security could not be guaranteed. Based on their interviews with Afghan 
returnees, Turton and Marsden identify three main factors that contributed to large-scale 
returns: the UNHCR assistance package, unrealistic expectations of the Afghan recon-
struction progress, and increasing pressures from the two host states.130  
First, even though UNHCR did not promote returns, the fact that it provided an 
assistance package gave returnees a sense of economic security. The assistance package 
also had “symbolic significance” as a sign that the protracted refugee situation was now 
coming to an end.131 Since this was UNHCR’s first facilitated repatriation program for 
the Afghan refugees since 1992, the agency’s support carried much weight. Second, 
through local and international media, refugees received the message that large amounts 
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of foreign aid were going to accelerate the reconstruction process in Afghanistan.132 
Third, Afghans in Pakistan and Iran were facing increasing police harassment and diffi-
culties in accessing employment, education and health services. Several camps in Paki-
stan were being closed and residents received notice to either return to Afghanistan or 
move to other – as a result overcrowded – camps.133 The following narrative from a 
woman interviewed by Turton and Marsden near Herat illustrates these motivations and 
pressures: 
The main reason we decided to leave is because of the assistance provided 
by the UN. The employment situation was not a consideration, nor was the 
attitude of the authorities. It was, however, difficult that we were always 
being called names. The children didn’t feel able to go outside. […] There 
was a lot of abuse on a daily basis. 
We also expect the UN will help with accommodation. We have nowhere 
to live. UNHCR in Teheran gave my husband four papers and told him to 
contact UNHCR in Mazar-i-Sherif. We don’t know what assistance we will 
get. My husband has relatives in Mazar but they are waiting for us to help 
them.134  
To be truly voluntary, repatriation has to be based on an informed decision re-
garding the conditions in the country of origin and freedom of choice regarding the coun-
try of asylum.135 The example above fulfills neither of those two requirements. First, the 
family was not informed about the level of assistance and reintegration support available 
in Afghanistan. Second, the woman referred to discrimination in Iran as one of the main 
motivations to repatriate. Contrary to the interviews collected by the AREU, UNHCR 
stated in its 2002 Operations Plan that refugees are well aware of the conditions in Af-
ghanistan, but recognized that they may feel forced to return: 
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Returnees are normally well aware of the security situation and other 
conditions in their areas of origin or previous residence. However, many 
feel they have no option but to return, despite the only relatively improved 
security conditions and economically difficult circumstances to re-
establish their livelihoods.136 
Against this background, the lines between facilitated and promoted voluntary re-
patriation seem to be quite blurry. Using the language of facilitated return, UNHCR and 
host states have been able to exert pressure on refugees, while appearing to adhere to the 
standards of voluntary repatriation laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As a result, 
the responsibility to ensure that a country is safe for dignified returns seems to lie with 
the refugees themselves and not with UNHCR.  
Given these pressures and motivations, who repatriated? According to Monsutti 
as well as Turton and Marsden,137 primarily short-staying refugees and those families 
who were already struggling to maintain their livelihoods in the host country decided to 
use UNHCR’s facilitated repatriation program. These people had either close ties to Af-
ghanistan or they took the risk of repatriation because they had little to lose. Studies138 
show that repatriation is most sustainable for refugees with economic and social capital, 
education or vocational training, and strong social networks. However, UNHCR’s repat-
riation assistance encouraged many families without these forms of capital to repatriate, 
making them highly vulnerable to human insecurities in Afghanistan. Eventually, return-
ees responded to these insecurities with migratory strategies resulting in considerable ref-
ugee backflows (see section 4.3). 
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4.2. UNHCR AND STATE-SPONSORED REINTEGRATION EFFORTS 
UNHCR and state-sponsored reintegration efforts faced three main challenges: 
First, the reintegration program was grossly under-budgeted as reconstruction aid had to 
be diverted to emergency relief. Second, in addition to economic insecurity all other 
forms of human insecurity persisted as Afghanistan had not reached a post-conflict stage. 
Third, a lack of livelihood opportunities limited the reintegration process, as many repat-
riating families were landless and the Afghan labor market could not absorb the large 
number of returnees. 
On the relief-development contiguum, sustainable reintegration support requires 
both short-term aid to address returnees’ most acute needs (food, shelter, medicine, etc.) 
and long-term development efforts to facilitate employment, education and societal inte-
gration. To link relief and development efforts in a sustainable way, aid agencies have 
been taking a development-oriented approach and are increasingly focusing on early re-
covery and transitional aid.139 In the context of repatriation and reintegration, the goal of 
early recovery and transitional aid is to give people “prospects for rebuilding and taking 
back control of their lives.”140 This approach includes facilitating dialogue between re-
turnees and local communities, assisting returnees in developing their livelihoods through 
employment or farming, and rehabilitating schools, hospitals and other public institu-
tions.  
While UNHCR aspires to bridge the relief-development gap with transitional aid, 
its narrow protection and assistance mandates limit any efforts of ensuring sustainable 
returns. In the past, the agency has used small, community-based Quick Impact Projects 
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(QIPs) to include developmental activities in its assistance program. In 2003, UNHCR 
published a broadened Framework for Durable Solutions, with which it seeks to include 
“long-term aspects in planning at an early stage in the process.”141 However, the QIPs 
turned out to be relatively unsustainable142 and the broadened Framework of Durable So-
lutions gained little traction in the development community.143 Against this background, 
the repatriation program in Afghanistan further illustrates the challenges UNHCR faces 
in its attempts to provide development-oriented assistance. 
In its “Initial Plan for the Return and Reintegration of Afghan Refugees and In-
ternally Displaced People 2002-2004,”144 UNHCR planned to focus its reintegration sup-
port on providing shelter repair, seed, and water. To link its short-term relief with 
development efforts, the agency also planned to play a supporting role with other organi-
zations in the health, education and agricultural sectors. The agency’s initial plans even 
included infrastructure QIPs to give returning refugees access to skills training and mi-
crocredit programs.  However, UNHCR had to quickly cut these extensive plans for rein-
tegration assistance once it became clear that the repatriation program would far exceed 
the initial projection of 850.000 returnees in 2002. In addition to a shortage of funds, 
UNHCR had problems establishing partnerships with NGOs to support implementation. 
At the time, few NGOs were both willing to operate in insecure areas and had the capaci-
ty to manage and dispense large-scale financial and material assistance.145 In 2002, the 
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agency only listed nine implementing partner in Afghanistan, all of which were interna-
tional NGOs or UN agencies.146  
As the Afghan government, aid agencies and donors were struggling to fulfill 
their promises and pledges,147 returnees had to cope with the entire range of human inse-
curities outlined in section 3.2. Returning refugees often found their homes, villages and 
all physical infrastructures destroyed. They also faced a lack of basic social services, such 
as health services and schools, and generally insecure living conditions shaped by contin-
ued armed conflict. In certain areas, the security situation deteriorated to the point that 
UNHCR periodically suspended its assistance to returning IDPs.148 These conflict-
induced insecurities were further exacerbated by the humanitarian impact of four years of 
drought. By 2002, Afghan farmers and nomads had lost 70% of their livestock. Even 
though rainfalls in 2003 provided some relief, another drought in 2004 affected most are-
as of Southern and central Afghanistan.149  
Returnees were the first to experience the effects of the relief-development gap 
caused by this continued complex emergency. In order to address the most acute needs of 
the Afghan people, such as lack of water, shelter and food insecurity, UNHCR had to re-
direct funds from its planned long-term reintegration support to immediate relief. The 
agency’s reintegration assistance for the first wave of refugee returns essentially consist-
ed of “transportation from neighboring countries to Afghanistan and [...] the allocation of 
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a basic support package, including blankets, tents, food, water and fuel.”150 As a result, 
the agency became the object of criticism from donors, the Afghan government, and ref-
ugees: 
Donors were complaining that UNHCR was overreaching itself by getting 
involved in “development” rather than “relief;” the Afghan government 
was complaining that precious development funds were being used merely 
to keep its citizens alive; and many returnees were complaining that they 
had been encouraged by promises of assistance to return to a situation in 
which they were worse off than in the country of asylum.151 
Since long-term reintegration support failed to materialize, returnees’ main chal-
lenge became a lack of livelihoods both through wage-earning labor and farming. With 
an estimated unemployment rate of 25% in 2004, the Afghan labor market was already at 
capacity and could therefore not absorb the large number of returnees. At the same time, 
returning refugees had high expectation for the Afghan government and international 
agencies’ support in terms of employment placement. Contrary to these expectations, in a 
2006 study of returnees’ integration in the Afghan labor market almost none of the re-
spondents received any assistance in their search for employment:  
Only 3% of interviewed households have been helped through job place-
ment services, while 47% were expecting such a support in returning to 
Afghanistan. The received support generally does not match expectations 
of the families, and is considered as insufficient by 89% of surveyed 
households who insist on the needs for more financial support (67%) and 
job placement (51%).152 
In addition to Afghanistan’s exhausted labor market, a major problem for return-
ees was the loss of land and resulting land rights disputes that left families with scarce 
arable land to sustain themselves. The fact that a large proportion of returning families 
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were landless also presented a challenge for UNHCR’s reintegration assistance. The 
agency had to adhere to the stipulation that it could only provide shelter assistance to re-
turnees with access to land on which to build their shelter.153 The loss of land forced 
many refugees and IDPs to return to places in Afghanistan, in which their families had 
never lived before. While the notion of “home” is ambivalent, returning to a place a refu-
gee never considered home before introduces additional problems. In these cases, “re-
turn” is actually another form of displacement, which can involve conflicts with local 
communities, rapid urbanization, lack of livelihoods, and aid dependency.154  
4.3. EXPLAINING REFUGEE BACKFLOWS 
While UNHCR had launched the largest repatriation program in history, the actu-
al number of long-term returns was much lower than population statistics suggest. Ac-
cording to the agency’s data, from 2002 to 2005 over 630,000 more refugees returned 
from Pakistan than were recorded to live there in 2001 (see Fig. 2). As discussed in Chap-
ter 1, refugee numbers are inherently unreliable because they are based on a narrow refu-
gee definition and do not reflect mixed migration. Still, in this case the counting anomaly 
is quite significant. Kronenfeld advances three explanations for the inconsistency of refu-
gee numbers: First, the number of refugees living in Pakistan increased rapidly due to the 
high birth rate of Afghans. Second, many refugees living in urban areas “disappeared” 
from UNHCR’s books. Third, UNHCR overcounted returns because refugees crossed the 
border repeatedly.155 This section focuses on Kronenfeld’s third explanation and explores 
why so many refugees decided to return to Pakistan and Iran after taking part in 
UNHCR’s repatriation program. 
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Fig. 2: Afghan refugees residing in and returning from Pakistan (2001-2006) 
 
Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database 
 
Repatriation without the Intention to Stay 
Part of the population of returnees never had the intention to stay in Afghanistan. 
A number of individuals as well a whole families engaged in what practitioners call “re-
cycling,” which means that refugees repatriated and returned to the host country multiple 
times in order to receive the assistance provided by UNHCR. Especially for refugees liv-
ing in Pakistan, recycling seems to have been a sensible strategy given that they only had 
to travel a short distance to cross the border and UNHCR was giving out cash grants to 
cover transportation costs. UNHCR responded to the problem of recycling not by recon-
sidering using cash grants but by installing “Iris Recognition Technology” at the Takhta 
Baig Voluntary Repatriation Center near Peshawar.156  
The phenomenon of recycling is not unique to the Afghan case because UNHCR 
representatives have expressed their difficulties with “cheating” refugees in various con-
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texts.157 For aid workers, recycling and other forms of working the system undoubtedly 
present practical problems. Not knowing the correct number of aid recipients leads to in-
effective planning and diverts aid from those who need it the most. However, UNHCR’s 
response begs the question how much is really to be gained by “catching” recyclers with 
surveillance technology.  
Worldwide, refugees and asylum seekers are living under the constant threat of 
being labeled a “false refugee.”158 Refugees experience these suspicions through discrim-
ination in host communities, arbitrary detention, invasive questioning during the process 
of status determination, and repeated counting and census taking. While monitoring re-
patriation registrations with Iris Recognition Technology has proven highly effective, it 
also perpetuates the already existing stereotype of the false refugee and creates an inva-
sive and threatening environment. So far, researchers have paid little attention to the mo-
tivations and experiences of recyclers, thus reinforcing the notion that these are “false 
refugees” outside the realm of refugee studies.  
Apart from recyclers, many Afghans who took part in UNHCR’s repatriation pro-
gram were actually seasonal migrants.159 They sought work in Afghanistan but never in-
tended to stay beyond the summer. For seasonal migrants, UNHCR’s assistance package 
facilitated transportation and covered some short-term needs in Afghanistan. The repatri-
ation program therefore became part of the charted history of migration between Afghan-
istan, Pakistan and Iran. 
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Response to Human Insecurity 
Finally, there was a large backflow of returnees who had difficulties 
(re)establishing themselves in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons and decided to return 
to the country of asylum. Since the backflow mostly consists of irregular border-
crossings, the exact number of repatriates who returned to Pakistan and Iran is not availa-
ble. However, cursory evidence suggests that a significant percentage of refugees who 
took part in the repatriation program did not stay in Afghanistan. Several studies indicate 
that repatriates’ primary reasons for returning to Pakistan and Iran were lack of shelter, 
lack of livelihood, personal insecurity, and personal enmity. In Kronenfeld’s study, the 
most frequent reasons cited for returning to or remaining in Pakistan were lack of shelter 
and/or land in Afghanistan.160  
Another approach to explaining refugee backflows is looking at those refugees 
who did not take part in the repatriation program. In a census of Afghan refugees admin-
istered by the Pakistani government, 57% of respondents cited lack of shelter and land as 
their main reason for not returning to Afghanistan. In comparison, only 18% of decided 
to stay in Pakistan because of personal insecurity in Afghanistan.161 Several of Kronen-
feld’s interviewees explained that they had already moved their entire families to Afghan-
istan, but decided to return to Pakistan because they wanted their children to have access 
to better quality education.162  
A different study of Afghans in Karachi suggests that even repatriates who found 
a job in Afghanistan had to return to Pakistan because they were not paid regularly.163 For 
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instance, one respondent, Afsar Khan, had found a position at a university in Kabul, but 
he did not receive his salary for three months. After living of his saving for three months 
he felt forced to return to Pakistan.164 Other repatriates who returned to Karachi stated 
that UNHCR did not provide the level of assistance it promised before facilitating repat-
riation. In particular, respondents were disappointed that UNHCR did not assist them in 
accessing land and housing.165  
Returnees with limited emotional and physical ties to Afghanistan experienced 
human insecurity even stronger. This was especially the case for second-generation refu-
gees and less mobile family members, such as women. Second-generation Afghan refu-
gees experienced particular difficulties in reintegrating because they did “not necessarily 
share the same intense identification with their ethnic or tribal group.”166 By 2002, the 
distinction between Afghans and their hosts in Pakistan and Iran had also eroded to some 
degree. Younger returnees therefore struggled not only with lower standards of quality of 
life, but also with identity crises. The emergence of new, hybrid identities is a common 
function of complex humanitarian disasters, which 
are by definition caused by multiple factors and researchers have docu-
mented how protracted crises and other major changes may throw up new 
groupings and identity categories as populations intermix, new livelihoods 
emerge and ties to original homelands change.167  
As discussed in section 3.3, Afghan women have been less mobile and therefore 
had fewer opportunities to maintain their links with Afghanistan. At the same time, in the 
absence of mobile men, female members of refugee households were able actively partic-
ipate in the more modernized societies of Iran and Pakistan. In the two host countries Af-
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ghan women were also able to access education and higher quality health care. Women 
who returned to Afghanistan therefore quickly felt the effects of the more traditional Af-
ghan society and the lack of social services. In the following, Hamida, a woman from Bi-
lal Colony in Karachi, explains why she did not want to stay in Afghanistan after repat-
repatriation: 
I didn’t like the country. There was no electricity and the children were 
always crying. My children became sick and the doctor was quite far from 
that area. The doctor was also not competent either. I stayed three for 
seven days and returned to Pakistan.168  
These responses of returnees suggest that not only personal insecurity but human 
insecurity on all levels challenged repatriation. However, UNHCR’s decision to facilitate 
repatriation was framed by the “conflict-refugee” concept, which for three reasons turned 
out to be a misleading premise: First, Afghanistan never reached a post-conflict stage, 
which means that refugees were returning to ongoing conflict situations. Second, return-
ees are vulnerable to a combination of humanitarian threats and development challenges, 
which are not only conflict-induced. Third, any attempts of repatriation therefore require 
critical analyses before, during, and after return that assess how the conflict and levels of 
human development will affect repatriation.  
What is Sustainable Repatriation? 
UNHCR’s initial repatriation plan envisaged that within only three years the 
agency would repatriate 5.2 million refugees (1.5 million from Iran and 2.2 million from 
Pakistan) and 3.5 million IDPs. The pure number of repatriates actually came very close 
to these projections as 4.5 million Afghan refugees returned between 2002-2005.169 
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While UNHCR deemed the repatriation program an overwhelming achievement,170 its 
true success should be measured based on the program’s sustainability and not based on 
the agency’s ability to move large numbers of people across the border. As a result of in-
tended and unintended returns to the two asylum countries, we can assume that in 2002 
the real number of sustainable repatriations was at least 200,000 lower than UNHCR sta-
tistics indicate.171  
In this context, it is important to clarify what we can reasonably expect from “sus-
tainable” returns. It would be misplaced to assume that – even with the necessary levels 
of human security and assistance – Afghan repatriates will take on sedentary existences 
in their old or new homes in Afghanistan. While this may be the trajectory of some re-
turning families, it seems likely that others will continue to use their transnational net-
works to send family members abroad, maintain their businesses in Pakistan and Iran, or 
seek wage-earning labor. Given the history and culture of transnational migration and the 
hybrid identities of Afghan refugees, continued cross-border migration would be a natural 
continuation of Afghan’s existing livelihood strategies. The fact that repatriates continue 
to migrate therefore does not necessarily indicate that UNHCR’s repatriation efforts were 
unsustainable.172  
So far, this report has acknowledged any type of migration as a coping strategy 
and therefore a form of refugee agency. However, it is important to recognize the thin 
line between forced and voluntary migration. On the one hand, the constructive effects of 
voluntary migration can and should be integrated into reconstruction plans. That is be-
cause remittances, transfer of human capital, as well as circular labor migration can act as 
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a “safety valve”173 and release some of the pressure put the Afghan labor market, infra-
structure, and social services. On the other hand, repeated forced migration in response to 
human insecurity is a sign that repatriation in its current form does not ensure safe and 
dignified returns.   
So, to determine how sustainable UNHCR’s repatriation program was, we need to 
ask: Did returnees feel forced to pursue migratory strategies as their only form of agency 
left in an environment of human insecurity? If their returns were forced, refugees did not 
have a realistic chance of reestablishing themselves in their new environment. From this 
perspective, for many Afghans who took part in UNHCR’s repatriation program between 
2002 and 2005, return was in fact unsustainable because a lack of shelter, arable land, 
employment, food, water, and basic health care forced them to use migration as their only 
coping strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
173 Turton & Marsden, Taking Refugees for a Ride?, 39. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. MAIN FINDINGS 
Three interlacing factors contributed to the unsustainability of UNHCR’s facili-
tated voluntary repatriation program. First, for many refugees the decision to repatriate 
was not truly voluntary. Returnees were pressured by refugee camp closures, hostilities 
and discrimination in the host country and the fear of becoming part of UNHCR’s residu-
al caseload and therefore losing protection status. It is also questionable whether refugees 
could make an informed decision about return given the inaccurate promises of recon-
struction assistance proliferated in the media. Considering how low the level of human 
security in Afghanistan was between 2002 and 2005, it seems unlikely that so many refu-
gees would have returned if they were fully informed about the security conditions.     
Second, UNHCR’s decision to facilitate repatriation was premature because even 
though by 2002 personal security had improved in some (but certainly not all) areas of 
Afghanistan, returnees were still confronted with human insecurity on all other levels. 
Faced with a lack of employment opportunities, arable land, social services, and overall 
integration support, returning families struggled to meet their most basic needs and to 
maintain their livelihoods. Even though the refugee agency draws a distinction between 
facilitating and supporting returns, UNHCR apparently did not take into account that any 
form of repatriation assistance also has symbolic meaning. So, while the agency was offi-
cially not supporting returns it still sent a strong signal that Afghanistan had reached a 
stage were dignified returns were possible.  
Third, UNHCR and the three governments had the misplaced expectation that re-
patriated refugees would in fact stay in Afghanistan. Contrary to this assumption, many 
returnees responded to human insecurity with migratory strategies, which for them was a 
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familiar form of agency. Returnees continued to engage in mixed migration within the 
region to pursue seasonal labor, run their businesses abroad, maintain social and familial 
relationships, and seek better social services, such as education and health care. Especial-
ly second-generation refugees sought to maintain their transnational identities and their 
role in the more modern societies of Iran and Pakistan. 
Overall, these factors indicate three larger problems inherent to the current ap-
proach to the durable solutions of repatriation. The first problem seems to be a disconnect 
between policy planning in the political and humanitarian domain on the one hand and 
different forms of agency and coping strategies on the individual and community level on 
the other hand. A common criticism of the Afghan repatriation program is that the needs 
of returnees have not been systematically incorporated in larger transition and recovery 
plans. However, this report showed that the reconstruction plans did not only fail to 
match returnees’ reintegration needs, but also overlooked their existing coping strategies 
and response mechanisms.  
Government officials and aid workers have long been aware of Afghan’s mixed 
transnational migration within the region. However, instead of integrating the value add-
ed by existing transnational networks, remittance systems, and highly mobile refugees, 
the repatriation program imposed a sedentary solution on returnees. The three govern-
ments and UNHCR could have supported refugees in their own assessment of and re-
sponse to human insecurity in Afghanistan by allowing cross-border movements. Instead, 
repeat crossers were labeled “recyclers” and repatriates who decided to move back to Pa-
kistan or Iran were forced to cross the border illegally. Those refugees who made the de-
cision to stay in the country of asylum faced increasing pressure as refugee camps were 
closed and aid to refugees remaining in Pakistan and Iran was reduced.  
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The second problem inherent to the current repatriation approach is UNHCR’s 
narrow protection mandate. In complex emergencies, causes of flight and motivations to 
migrate overlap, which is why scholars refer to Afghan displacement as crisis migration 
or mixed migration. However, according to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Proto-
cols, forced migrants only fall within the refugee definition if they are fleeing war, perse-
cution or severe limitation of their personal freedom. While this was certainly the fact for 
Afghan refugees, it does not follow that repatriation becomes an option as soon as these 
conflict-related causes of flight disappear. To the contrary, large-scale repatriation can 
only be sustainable if refugees return to an environment with a minimum level of human 
security. Where to set the human security benchmark for repatriation is an important 
question to be addressed by further scholarship. 
Third, similar to UNHCR’s narrow protection mandate, its assistance mandate is 
also limited to short-term relief. This is problematic because returnees have both relief 
needs and development aspirations. The lack of transitional aid for returnees became 
even more pronounced as continued humanitarian needs and the sheer scale of returns 
forced aid agencies to divert limited funds available for reconstruction to emergency as-
sistance. UNHCR attempted to bridge the gap between relief and development by sup-
porting the reintegration of returnees. However, the agency’s quick impact projects were 
more of a band-aid solution than sustainable development-oriented assistance. By provid-
ing only minimal development assistance, UNHCR has become part of the problem and 
perpetuated the lack of development-oriented reintegration support. That is because see-
ing UNHCR’s attempts, there was less urgency for other development actors, such as the 
UNDP, to include repatriates in their development programs.   
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5.2. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Four main ideas frame the recommendations of this report: First, solutions should 
be sought on a regional level since the Afghan PRS exists in several host countries and 
refugee agency takes place across borders. Second, it is important to go beyond simply 
administrating human misery by recognizing and harnessing the innovative potential of 
different forms of refugee agency. Third, protection is still UNHCR’s main mandate and 
should not be sacrificed. Fourth, reductionist categories of “migrants” and “refugees” do 
not reflect the complexity of identities and decision-making processes of Afghan refu-
gees.  
Based on these ideas and the main findings of this report, the aid agencies and 
states should take the following steps to improve their approach to protracted refugee sit-
uations: First, to ensure that repatriation is in fact a durable solution, it should only be 
initiated once human security is guaranteed in the origin country. UNHCR should base its 
decision to facilitate repatriation on extensive needs assessments. Any political interests 
of host and origin countries should be clearly divorced from the question of repatriation.   
Second, the durable solutions framework should be expanded to include more 
space for refugee agency. Regional regulated labor migration is a viable strategy to create 
sustainable livelihoods for refugees and should be facilitated. To assist reintegration, 
UNHCR should assume a facilitating and coordinating role rather than attempting to 
close the relief-development gap with “development band-aids.” Third, the refugee defi-
nition should be expanded to include factors of complex emergencies beyond physical 
violence and persecution that can endanger livelihoods, such as environmental and eco-
nomic insecurities. The human security concept is a useful tool to expand both UNHCR’s 
protection and assistance mandate. 
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